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Since 9/11, little statistical rigor has been placed on identifying the correlates of hospital 
preparedness. This quantitative study explores the research question: Is there a correlation 
between the employment of a designated hospital preparedness coordinator and the 
reported level of preparedness for: (a) general preparedness; (b) chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events; (c) pandemic disease outbreaks; (d) mass 
casualty events; and (e) internal infrastructure failure, as assessed by an online survey. 
Alternative analysis was conducted to assess the relationship between access to resources 
and the five dependent variables. Using complexity theory as the theoretical framework, 
point biserial correlation and Pearson’s method were used to assess the relations between 
the dependent and independent variables. Initially, no statistically significant correlative 
relationship was found using point biserial analysis. However, further analysis found that 
the correlation between full-time employment of a preparedness coordinator and 
pandemic preparedness reached significance. Point biserial analysis of the alternative 
research questions found statistically significant correlations between access to 
preparedness resources, CBRN, pandemic, and infrastructure failure preparedness. 
Pearson analysis found a statistically significant correlation between single facility 
coordinator responsibilities and pandemic preparedness. This identifies at least two 
significant correlates of hospital preparedness.  Positive social change can be achieved by 
identifying strategies that leverage these assets in a fiscally sustainable constructs that 
maximize hospitals’ ability to effectively serve the community in disasters but that do not 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Study 
Introduction 
Hospital preparedness for catastrophic disasters, including those involving 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear/weapons of mass destruction 
(CBRN/WMD), mass casualty events, pandemics and disease outbreaks, and 
infrastructure failure, have garnered significant attention over the past decade. In the 
years since September 11, 2001, health and health care preparedness and those disciplines 
associated with it have become increasingly important to overall preparedness of a 
community. In addition to the ability of the health care infrastructure to maintain and 
sustain operations during a disaster with significant health impacts, an integral part of that 
equation has become those individuals responsible for coordinating and executing those 
tasks and actions associated with the health preparedness of a community. However, little 
rigor has been devoted to ascertaining how these individuals influence overall 
preparedness at the community or at the facility level.  
The present study was a quantitative analysis of the impact of these individuals on 
health care facilities and systems and their ability to provide care and sustain operations 
during disasters. Providing data and analysis on the potential impact of these individuals 
in a disaster situation could affect decisions made by hospital and health care systems 
when deciding how best to plan for and allocate funds and resources for the preparedness, 





entire community’s health and well-being, especially as it relates to responses to 
pandemics and disease outbreaks, CBRN incidents, and natural disasters. 
This chapter (a) discusses the background of the issues; (b) describes the nature of 
the problem; (c) outlines the nature of the study and the theoretical basis; (d) identifies 
the research questions and research hypotheses; (e) provides an overview of the methods; 
and (f) describes the limitations and delimitations associated with these methods. Chapter 
2 examines the literature on hospital preparedness and preparedness coordinators, and 
Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology for assessing how preparedness coordinators 
influence a hospital’s preparedness for terrorist incidents, pandemics, and natural 
disasters.  
Background 
The events of September 11, 2001, the subsequent bacillus anthracis attacks (also 
known as Amerithrax), and Hurricane Katrina have resulted in a much greater emphasis 
on response to disasters, preparedness, and related disciplines. The Federal government 
and state governments have placed major emphasis on a whole community approach to 
national preparedness (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), 
2006). A key component in this strategy is the preparedness of the nation’s health care 
and medical service delivery system. In the more than a 10 years since the 9/11 tragedy, 
billions of dollars have been spent on increasing the preparedness and resilience of public 





Despite this increased attention and spending, gaps remain in the preparedness 
and capability of the hospital and health care infrastructure to respond to and recover 
from disasters with significant health components (Valesky et al., 2011; Kaji, Koenig, & 
Lewis, 2007). Disasters including 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the pandemic outbreak of 
H1N1, and, most recently, superstorm Sandy has reinforced the nature and seriousness of 
the deficiencies and gaps in health care preparedness capacity and capabilities. These 
gaps include: 
1. Surge capacity (Rebmann, Carrico, & English, 2007). 
2. Preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive (CBRNE) events and terrorist attacks (McInerney & Richter, 2011). 
3. Preparedness for mass casualty events (Peleg & Kellerman 2012) 
4. Training of clinical and non-clinical staff (Heinrichs, Youngblood, Harter, & 
Dev, 2008; Scott et al., 2012) 
5. Pandemic and infectious disease preparedness (Moen, Kennedy, Cheng & 
MacDonald, 2014) 
6. Hospital incident command and crisis management (Nemeth, Wears, Patel, 
Rosen, & Cook, 2011; Yarmohammadian, Atighechian, Hagshenas, & Shams, 
2013) 
7. Coordinated planning (Zusman & Marghella, 2013) 
In addition to these gaps, there are significant challenges to hospital and health care 





1. Risk perception and the concept of health care disasters as low probability-
high impact events (Barbera, Yeatts, & Macintyre, 2009; Zusman & 
Merghella, 2013) 
2. Increased focus on hospital cost centers, health care economics, and profit 
margins (Barbera, Yeatts, & Macintyre, 2009; Zusman & Merghella, 2013) 
3. Increased government focus and accreditation requirements (Barbera, Yeatts, 
& Macintyre, 2009)  
The gaps and challenges listed, taken in there totality, present a formidable obstacles to 
hospital preparedness.   
As a product of this increased emphasis and funding, resulting, in part, from the 
lessons observed from the Amerithrax attacks and Hurricane Katrina, hospitals and health 
care systems have increasingly begun to employ preparedness, disaster, and emergency 
management coordinators (Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 2007a). These individuals are 
directly responsible for: (a) compliance with state and federal preparedness mandates; (b) 
training of staff; (c) accreditation issues; and (d) other preparedness and emergency 
management related duties. These professionals are markedly different than their 
predecessors. In years past, hospitals categorized emergency preparedness as an ancillary 
duty held by a practicing physician or nurse, or distributed among disparate offices within 
the hospital or system.  
In 2007, the National Public Health and Hospital Institute (NPHHI) conducted 





and Health Systems (NAPH) to determine the number of hospitals with such 
professionals (Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 2007a). The survey found that 15 of the 60-
hospitals (25 percent) surveyed had dedicated emergency management/preparedness 
professionals on staff (Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 2007b). They concluded that 
designated emergency preparedness professionals might be critical in increasing and 
maintaining hospital preparedness.  
Additional qualitative works have been attempted with the goal of establishing 
links between designated preparedness coordinators and reported levels of preparedness; 
of note are studies from University of Pittsburgh Medical Center in 2009 and NAPH in 
2007. However, this and the other studies did not use any scientific or statistical rigor in 
ascertaining a measure of effect of these professionals. Without a greater understanding 
of the influence and impact of these professionals on a health care facility’s overall 
preparedness and its ability to operate during special crises events, it will be difficult to 
understand how to address current gaps and shortfalls in health care preparedness.  
Epidemiological Perspectives 
According to Sosin & Besser (2008), preparedness and response to bioterrorism 
events became of import to field epidemiologists in the early 1950s, during the early 
years of the Cold War. The United States Public Health Service established the Epidemic 
Intelligence Service which focused on training physicians and allied health professionals 
on the application of epidemiological principles to disease control, whether naturally 





2001 Anthrax letters, natural disasters, and the growing threat of terrorists with WMD 
has increased the demands on and exposed the gaps in public health and healthcare 
preparedness and response. Besser and Sosin make the case the epidemiologists have a 
very distinct and important role to play in closing these gaps.  
Sosin & Besser state that epidemiologists, and more specifically field 
epidemiologists, are uniquely suited to the role and responsibilities of supporting and 
leading preparedness and response activities in the public health and health care delivery 
settings (Gregg, 2008). They highlight the roles of epidemiologists’ in planning, 
exercising those plans, assessing threats, and evaluating response and corrective actions 
as vital to preparedness programs and response to disasters with significant health effects, 
both man-made and natural. They also assert that the epidemiologist’s role in 
preparedness and response are rooted in the application of conventional epidemiology, 
but that it also encompasses an understanding and familiarity of environmental problems, 
occupational hazards, operational issues, and other disciplines integral to public health.  
Assigning the tasks of health care preparedness to the epidemiologist is not a new 
concept. The state of North Carolina currently has a program that embeds 
epidemiologists in hospitals. They execute the standard roles of an epidemiologist but 
also to provide assistance to the hospital preparedness coordinator or staff elements 
responsible for preparedness with the tasks associated with preparing staff and facility for 
emergencies, especially disease outbreaks and bioterrorism. Markiewicz et al. (2012) 





hospitals to enhance syndromic surveillance, communicable disease management, and 
public health emergency preparedness and response. 
Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying health care 
infrastructure is essential to planning and mounting an effective response to incidents and 
accidents with significant health impacts. The current study has the potential to provide 
epidemiologists another tool to help plan for and respond to such events.  
Problem Statement 
Despite the prevalence of these professionals and the general respect for their 
efforts, there are sparse data on the effect these individuals (or staffs of individuals) have 
as it relates to the all-hazards preparedness of a hospital or hospital system. After a 
careful review of the literature, there is no evidence that a study of this nature within the 
hospital and health care setting has been attempted.  
As stated previously, the knowledge base on the topic is sparse. However, the 
studies and data available show a strong qualitative belief that designated hospital 
preparedness professionals provide a valuable service. The National Association of 
Public Hospital and Healthcare Systems 2006 annual preparedness appraisal of its 
member hospitals asserts that these professionals are greatly improving hospital 
preparedness (Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 2007b). Additionally, Toner et al (2009) 
provide additional context in there study sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh 





of preparedness planning within their respective facilities (Toner et al., 2009). In both 
instances, this information is purely qualitative in nature.   
In contrast, Kano & Bourque (2008) look at the statistical correlates of 
preparedness for individual schools in the Los Angeles Unified School System. They 
found that a key indicator for schools with higher levels of preparedness was that they 
had access to a designated preparedness coordinator (Kano & Bourque, 2008). They also 
found that even when the school only had part-time access to such a professional the 
school reported higher levels of preparedness.  
Additionally, findings by Avery & Zabriskie-Timmerman (2009) showed that 
hiring an emergency preparedness coordinator increased preparedness activities of health 
departments (Avery & Zabriskie-Timmerman, 2009). When they modeled their findings 
to identify if this were true in broader applications, they also found that all models 
pointed to greater level of preparedness activities if these individuals were present in the 
model.  
Although, Kano & Bourque (2008) and Avery & Zabriskie-Timmerman (2009) 
have identified that there seems to be a correlation between access to preparedness 
coordinators and level of preparedness, they admit that more research and study is 
required. As it relates to medical and health care preparedness, no such study has been 
conducted and therefore the literature is devoid of any data correlating these types of 
professionals with overall preparedness or with these professionals and specific types of 





Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this quantitative survey-based study is to ascertain if a correlation 
exists between the designated preparedness/disaster coordinator (DPDC) position and a 
hospital’s reported level of overall preparedness for CBRN and mass casualty events, 
pandemics and disease outbreaks, and infrastructure failure. The theory applied to this 
research is the complexity theory (Hilhorst, 2003). The population studied consists of the 
member hospitals of the Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance and District Five of the 
Maryland Hospital Association.  
Theoretical Base 
Hospitals are systems within a system. They are part of the larger construct of 
social, political, economic, and technical systems. This is especially true of safety-net 
hospitals, which are funded by the county or city for which they serve and are subject to 
the shifts in political, economic, and social change sentiment. Complexity theory 
provides a method by which a hospital emergency preparedness coordinator may manage 
these systems and subsystems; it also provides a roadmap to navigate the internal and 
external factors associated with the systems approach (Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 
2007b).  
Because of its integrated systems-based approach, complexity theory provides an 
appropriate framework for modeling the cross-cutting factors of a hospital in a disaster 
context. The following factors are also reasons why complexity theory provides a suitable 





generally: (a) Disaster management is dynamic and requires an adaptive system. This 
involves cross boundary integration and a diverse mix of personnel, clinical and non-
clinical specialties, and internal and external stakeholders. (b) Previous and current 
literature as well as recent disasters has increased the body of knowledge and 
understanding of the complexity of disasters and disaster management for health care and 
public health, yet few studies have examined empirically what the necessary ingredients 
are for crisis management within the context of a health care facility. This gap in the 
literature is particularly apparent with respect to personnel charged with the actual crisis 
and disaster management (O’Sullivan, Kuziemsky, Sullivan, & Corneil, 2012). A more 
detailed outline of the complexity theory and its relationship to this study is contained in 
Chapter 2.  
The primary dependent variables in this study are overall hospital preparedness, 
CBRN and mass casualty event preparedness, preparedness for pandemics and disease 
outbreaks, and preparedness for infrastructure failure. The National Healthcare 
Preparedness Capabilities defines eight key capabilities needed for hospitals and health 
care systems to effectively and efficiently prepare, respond, and recover from disasters 
with health implications or public health and medical emergencies. The National 
Healthcare Preparedness Capabilities include:.(a) health care system preparedness; (b) 
health care system recovery; (c) emergency operations coordination; (d) fatality 
management; (e) information sharing; (f) medical surge; (g) responder health and safety; 





From a practical perspective, testing each of the hospital preparedness program 
(HPP) core capabilities and associated functions was beyond the scope of this study. 
However, a review of the literature did identify key capabilities and functions considered 
to be of increased importance as they relates to overall hospital preparedness. These 
include:  
1. Plans and the degree to which these plans account for an all-hazards approach 
and response to disasters.  
2. Coordination of training and exercises among hospital staff and with support 
organizations. 
3. Staff and facility surge capacity. 
4. Memoranda of agreement (MOA), memoranda of understanding (MOU), and 
planning partnerships with other hospitals, health care facilities, state 
authorities, local authorities, and other supporting service providers. 
5. Overall hospital or system funding and access to funding and preparedness 
level resources.  
6. Socioeconomics and demographics of communities served. (ASPR, 2012; 
O’Sullivan et al., 2012; Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 2007a):  
Each of the six elements above are systems-based functionalities and require 
considerable leadership and coordination to efficiently and effectively ensure that 
hospitals and  health care systems are adequately prepared to respond to and recover from 





as tasks or task objectives with specific requirements to be met in order for a hospital to 
acquire and maintain an adequate level of preparedness. Because these items can be 
viewed as objectives with supporting tasks, task ownership and organization, especially 
during the potential chaos of an emergent situation, becomes vitally important (Valle, 
2000).  
Complexity theory is especially suited to serve as the theoretical framework for 
the present study. The theory focuses on task organization, process ownership, and 
internal and external interactions and their correlation to preparedness of health care 
delivery systems for the range of emergency detailed in this work (Plsek & Wilson, 
2001).  
Research Questions 
My overarching research question was: What is the effect of DPDC on the overall 
preparedness reporting of hospitals? In addition, I examined the following sub questions 
and hypotheses: 
Research Question 1: Is there correlation between overall hospital preparedness 
and the employment of a DPDC? 
H01: There is no correlation between overall preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC.  
H11: There is a correlation between overall preparedness and the employment 





Research Question 2: Is there a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of 
preparedness for CBRN and mass casualty events and the employment of a 
DPDC?  
H02: There is no correlation between CBRN preparedness and mass casualty 
event preparedness and the employment of a DPDC. 
H12: There is a correlation between hospital CBRN and mass casualty event 
preparedness and employment of a DPDC.  
Research Question 3: Is there a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of 
preparedness for a pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC?  
H03: There is no correlation between pandemic preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC.  
H13: There is a correlation between hospital preparedness for pandemic 
disease outbreaks and the employment of a DPDC. 
Research Question 5: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of 
preparedness for a mass casualty event and the employment of a DPDC? 
H04: There is no statistically significant correlation between mass casualty 
event preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
H14: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between mass 
casualty event preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
Research Question 5: Is there a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of 





H05: There is no correlation between preparedness for infrastructure failure 
and employment of a DPDC.  
H15: There is a correlation between hospital preparedness for infrastructure 
failure or outages and the employment of a DPDC. 
Nature of Study 
The present study was a quantitative assessment of the overall and specific 
incident preparedness of selected hospitals in Northern Virginia and Southern Maryland. 
The target population was member hospitals of the Northern Virginia Hospital 
Association and District Five of the Maryland Hospital Association, which consist of the 
counties and municipalities surrounding Washington, D.C. The study involved an 
individual facility survey that focused on hospital characteristics, make-up and 
organization of their preparedness programs, and strategic level preparedness information 
and indicators. The instrument itself was adapted from existing instruments and 
checklists that were designed and validated to measure hospital preparedness. Point 
Biserial Correlation Analysis and Effect Size was done using SPSS 22.0 software suite to 
determine the attributes of hospital preparedness and the relationship between hospital 
preparedness, those central attributes, and the employ of a DPDC.  
This method, the population, and the instruments were selected for several 
specific reasons. First, Kano & Bourque (2008) used a similar methodology to show a 
correlation between designated disaster preparedness coordinators and increased levels of 





sample is a convenience sample which has been selected because of the its proximity to 
the researcher and the unprecedented access, support, and cooperation being granted by 
the Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance and District 5 of the Maryland Hospital 
Association. Finally, the instrumentation being adapted for the present study are open 
source and have been designed, deployed, and validated in assessing hospital 
preparedness as well as hospital preparedness for specific events.   
Operational Definitions and Key Terms 
This section provides operational definitions for terms and phrases germane to the 
research. The operational definitions consist of those relevant to the dependent and 
independent variables. 
Accreditation. Accreditation is a self-imposed self-assessment and external peer 
assessment process used by health care organizations to accurately assess their level of 
performance in relation to established standards and to implement ways to continuously 
improve. The Joint Commission accreditation is the most widely sought-after because it 
is a mark of attainment that allows hospital to receive Medicaid and Medicare 
reimbursement for services (Agency for Health Research and Quality, 2011).   
Designated preparedness/disaster coordinator (DPDC). A DPDC is a person or 
staff of individuals within a hospital who are responsible for pre-, trans-, and post disaster 
operations designed to ensure that the hospital, in its totality, runs efficiently and 





Funding. Funding refers to the amount and also the type of money used to support 
the preparedness program, which includes grant money, capital funds, and donations 
(ASPR, 2012). 
Interagency planning. Interagency planning refers to a hospital’s engagement, 
planning, and coordination with both public and private sector stakeholders to ensure 
synergy in efforts and operations during a disaster (ASPR, 2012).  
Intra-agency collaboration. Intra-agency collaboration refers to the collaboration 
and planning of a hospitals internal clinical, allied, and support functions that enhance 
(ASPR, 2012). 
Level of preparedness. Level of preparedness is a product of the measurement of 
the survey instrument. It is a composite score and snapshot of a facility’s overall 
preparedness. The measures are based on recognized measures of preparedness. For the 
purposes of this study, no one measure is weighted higher or more important than any 
other (Kaji et al., 2007).  
Preparedness reporting. For the purposes of this study, preparedness reporting is 
a proxy measure for actual preparedness and ability to respond (Kaji et al., 2007).  
Preparedness spending and resource base. Preparedness spending and resource 
base refers to the sum total of preparedness related equipment and funds a hospital directs 
towards its preparedness program (Kaji et al., 2007).  
Specific events. This term is used within this context of the current study to denote 






Limitations considered in this research study included those of validity, reliability, 
and other limitations.  
Validity  
Face validity refers to whether an indicator; or in this case a question in the 
research survey, and appears is a substantively accurate measure of a variable (Babbie, 
2010). The questions presented in this survey for the dependent variable (level of hospital 
preparedness and designated DPDC) and the independent variables were separated 
categorically, and I designed the questions specifically to provide a reasonable measure 
for the variables. 
External validity is defined as the degree to which a study’s conclusions would 
hold outside of the study’s target population, in a different setting, and at different points 
in time (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). This should be a major planning consideration 
when designing and executing a research study. Based on the universal measures used to 
assess the dependent variable and the independent measures used to assess the 
correlational relationship between these measures and DPDC, this study has external 
validity. However, the sample population of hospitals my present some challenges. These 
sample hospitals are only those that border Washington, D.C. and are not fully 
representative of every hospital within the United States. 
Construct validity is achieved by ensuring that the program is properly reflected 





Donnelly, 2007). In this research, the construct is the independent variable of 
employment of a DPDC. The effect construct is the dependent variable, the level of 
overall preparedness and specific event preparedness as previously defined. These 
constructs were selected based on the review and research hypotheses and questions 
derived from the same. Except for survey questions pertaining to the hospital 
preparedness program profile, the remaining questions operationalized these cause and 
effect constructs and asked the respondents—the individuals who are responsible, at least 
in-part, for preparedness—to provide specific data points that relate to the construct 
measures within their facility.  
Threats to internal validity can be reasons, conclusions, or inferences of a study 
that may be incorrect (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). They may occur in this study in the 
form of social interaction threats, where the survey respondents may not be completely 
objective due to fears of retribution from supervisors, managers, and administrators 
whom the respondents feel may have access to their survey responses (Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007). Because of the nature of the study, it was difficult to avoid this. The 
individuals in the study were ultimately responsible to the leadership of the hospitals and 
may have felt pressured to embellish survey responses. As the mechanism to counter this, 
respondents were made aware that the data would be aggregated and no single hospital 
would be called out specifically. An additional measure employed to counter this 
particular threat was to garner the support and buy-in of the overarching hospital 





instructed not to consult one another about participation or compare answers with one 
another, further limiting threats to validity (Vogt, 2007). 
Reliability  
Reliability is an indicator of the quality of a measurement and may be defined as 
the degree to which a measurement is consistent, dependable, or repeatable (Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007). The primary types of reliability include test-retest reliability, internal-
consistency reliability, inter-rater or inter-observer reliability, and parallel-forms 
reliability. 
As the survey was being administered online under the auspices of a mid-Atlantic 
state’s county emergency management and services departments, it was not practical to 
utilize the test-retest method for the evaluation of reliability in this study. Due to the 
nature of the study, it was not practical to use test-retest as a measure of validity. 
However, it was possible to evaluate internal–consistency reliability due to the design of 
the survey; it employed multiple survey questions related to each of the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. Several distinct and interrelated questions 
addressed each of the independent variable subtypes, as well as questions related to the 
dependent variable a as a research hypothesis. It is also important to note that this study 
presented all survey respondents with standardized questions. For this reason, the chances 
of unreliability of the measurements have been significantly reduced and inter-rater or 





survey questions greatly reduced respondent unreliability significantly and eliminated the 
need to conduct a time-consuming parallel-forms reliability assessment.  
Other Limitations  
Other limitations of this study include methodological limitations and limitations 
of the researcher. Methodological limitations relevant to this study are sample size, a lack 
of prior research studies on this subject area, and the use of a researcher designed survey 
that was not pilot-scale tested. Relevant limitations of the researcher include the my 
limited access to study participants and the inability to account for longitudinal effects in 
the data due to the limited time frame established for data collection.  
Scope and Delimitations 
The population surveyed for this study consists of hospitals and the person or 
persons responsible for each of their preparedness programs and activities within the 
Washington, D.C. metro area. This included counties in both the State of Maryland and 
the State of Virginia. The surveyed hospitals were members of hospital associations that 
act as consortiums for thought, policy, and standard operating procedures, including 
preparedness. Those individuals or internal offices charged with the coordination of each 
hospitals preparedness programs are responsible for planning, resource management, 
training and exercises, internal and external coordination, and a myriad of others tasks. 
They are also the best qualified to discuss information and issues related to the 





Hospitals outside the National Capital Region (NCR) and their DPDCs were 
excluded from the study and were not required from the standpoint of statistical 
significance to prove or disprove the research hypotheses. Noting the limitations of the 
sample size, this research cannot be generalized to the national population of hospitals 
but could serve as a template and springboard for further research into the main 
questions.  
Significance 
The goal of this research was to explore the relatioinship between designated 
emergency preparedness professionals, as defined above, and the overall all-hazards 
preparedness reporting of hospitals (where reporting is a proxy measure of overall 
preparedness). This study also sought to predict whether or not hospitals with a 
designated emergency manager reported higher levels of preparedness. This study has the 
potential to influence hospitals and health systems hiring practices, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures as they relate to preparedness. This research project is also unique 
because despite a considerable body of editorial writing and commentary on the topic, no 
true scientifically rigorous or systistical investigation has been conducted to ascertain the 
benefits, or lack there of, of this population.  
Disaster preparedness and resilience of community have social implication pre-, 
trans-, and postdisaster (Keim, 2008). The organization and management of health 
systems and their ability to adapt, maintain, and sustain operations and deliver needed 





disaster (Obama, 2010). Based on the hypotheses of the present study, that DPDCs are 
the gatekeepers of and catalysts for overall hospital preparedness as well as preparedness 
for specific events, it is believed that there are significant social change implications.  
As stated previously, gaps remain in hospital and health care preparedness. At a 
time when these gaps are become more apparent, spending on closing these gaps and the 
number of professionals associated with closing these gaps has decreased (Toner et al., 
2009). If communities expected to attain and remain resilient, health care must be a 
integral piece of this equation (National Health Security Strategy, 2009). Recent events in 
Boston have provide policy analysts the ability to understand how a so-called textbook 
hospital response to mass casualty incidents should be executed (Lee & Mckinney, 2013). 
However, this response also underscores the advantages of hospitals with internal disaster 
coordination and large resource bases. This response also shows that in a era of shrinking 
internal preparedness budgets as well as external preparedness funding, that internal 
management of preparedness is becoming more and more important to the the health of a 
community (Trust for American Health, 2014).  
This study will add to the very scant body of knowledge related to the effect of 
disaster coordinators on hospital preparedness for the range of disasters detailed in this 
work. Hospitals and health care organizations provide a vital service to their 
communities. During a disaster, these hospitals are seen as islands of safety and security 





change are improved hospital preparedness and an increased community preparedness 
and resilience in the event of disaster. 
Summary 
A key part of the emergency preparedness and response infrastructure is public 
health and health care infrastructure. These components are at the core of a community’s 
resilience and ability to recover from disaster, especially those with significant health 
impacts. In the wake of 9/11, Amerithrax, Hurricane Katrina, and the pandemic outbreak 
of H1N1, there has been an increased interest in and focus on the preparedness and 
resilience of the U.S. public health and health care infrastructure. In the years after 9/11, 
considerable grant dollars and government program dollars have been spent in an effort 
to close the apparent capability and capacity gaps. Despite the increased attention on 
formalized programs and spending, there are still major deficiencies and gaps in hospital 
and health care preparedness, and as priorities shift these the funding streams continuity 
to be decrease and reallocated to competing priorities both at the state and federal levels. 
In response to and based on the urgency of these gaps and deficiencies in 
preparedness, many hospitals and health care systems have created position for 
preparedness/disaster coordinators. Although there has been increased investment by the 
health care industry and the federal government to fill these positions and considerable 
credit given to these positions for increasing the preparedness of these institutions, no 
scientific or statistical studies have been done to establish such a link or correlation 





In order to identify the correlates of hospital preparedness, this survey-based, 
quantitative study will test the hypotheses that the independent variables—the 
employment of designated preparedness/disaster coordinators, funding, preparedness 
program organization, environmental factors, accreditation, and program robustness—are 
positively correlated with a hospital level of preparedness.  
The limitations taken into consideration in this study include validity, reliability, 
and other limitations. Face validity, external validity, construct validity, and external 
validity were all considered. Test-retest reliability, internal-consistency reliability, inter-
rater or inter-observer reliability, and parallel-forms reliability were also addressed in the 
context of this study. Methodological limitations are sample size, a lack of prior research 
studies on this subject area, and the use of a researcher-designed survey that was not 
pilot-scale tested. The main limitation of the researcher was my limited access and 
interaction with the study participants. 
The scope of this study included member-hospitals of hospital associations in the 
jurisdictions immediately surrounding the NCR, Maryland Hospital Association Region 
Five and the Northern Virginia Hospital Association. While the individual hospitals are 
members of these organizations, there is wide variation in their operational and tactical 
level preparedness programs. Additionally, these hospitals represent a mixture of urban, 
suburban, and rural facilities.  
As a seminal work focusing on the quantitative measure of how a preparedness 





its contribution to a body of qualitative data. Health care and hospital preparedness are 
essential functions of governments and health authorities. They also have a direct bearing 
on a community’s ability to respond to and recover from disasters. Improving health care 
and hospital preparedness promotes social change by ensuring that the health care 
infrastructure in a given community can support the response to and recovery from 
disasters with significant health components and impacts. This study is also significant in 
that it provides as vehicle by which field epidemiologists can investigate, evaluate, and 
categorize that health care preparedness in a given jurisdiction, based on the organization 
and management practices of its hospitals.  
Chapter 2 covers topics related to the present study, including: the theoretical base 
of the study, a brief description of hospital preparedness, an overview of current gaps in 
hospital preparedness, health care infrastructure, and measures of hospitals preparedness, 
and dependent and independent variables. The topics constituting the independent 
variables include a designated hospital preparedness/disaster coordinator, funding, 
accreditation, community engagement and collaborative planning, and exercises and 
training. There are definite gaps in the literature corresponding to the relationship of these 
independent variables to what has been defined in this study as the dependent variable of 
hospital preparedness. As evidenced in this literature review, much of the focus on 
hospital preparedness has been directed towards the actual planning and funding issues 
and not the actual management, organization, and execution of preparedness activities. 





public health or health care has not been determined. For this reason, this study makes an 
important contribution to public health and health care preparedness.  
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology leveraged in this study of hospital 
preparedness and the effect on designated hospital preparedness/disaster coordinators, 
including a description of the dependent and independent variables and the my role in 
data collection. The target population is described, which was drawn from the member-
hospitals for both the North Virginia Hospital Association and District Five of the 
Maryland Hospital Association. These are the jurisdictions that are closest to 
Washington, D.C. The survey instrument consisted of approximately 50 questions in the 
categories of respondent hospital profile, accreditation and affiliation, emergency 
planning, training and exercises, disaster operations, funding, community engagement 
and collaborative planning, and preparedness program administration and execution. 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for all study variables. Differences in means were 
tested using independent sample t tests and differences between frequency distributions, 
or proportions, were tested using Pearson chi-square tests. Bivariate correlations were 
calculated between all independent variables using Pearson’s method. 
Multivariate analyses were done to test each research hypotheses. Taken into 
consideration were threats to face-, external-, construct-, and internal validity. Reliability 
considerations included internal-consistency-, inter-observer-, and parallel-forms 
reliability. Data were analyzed using the IBM SPSS Version 20.0 statistical software 





consent, anonymity, and deception. Dissemination of the research findings is anticipated 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to test the impact of DPDCs on the general overall 
preparedness of a hospital as well as its preparedness for specific catastrophic events, 
including: CBRN events, pandemic disease, infrastructure failure, and mass casualty 
events. Additionally, this study will look at the impact of funding and resource base on a 
hospital’s level of preparedness for the same events. This literature review focuses on the 
questions, hypotheses, and alternative hypotheses considered by this research study.  
At issue is the lack of statistically and scientifically rigorous analysis of the effect 
of designated preparedness and disaster coordinators on a hospital’s overall preparedness. 
There have been no statistically validated studies to identify the relationship between 
such individuals or staff teams and the overall preparedness of a given facility or health 
system. However, there is anecdotal evidence and testimonial evidence that such a link 
exists. There is also reason to believe there is a correlation between higher levels of 
preparedness activities in hospitals and the DPDC position. Studies in schools and public 
health departments have shown that employment or access to the services of these 
individuals result in higher levels of preparedness-related activities and higher senior 
level confidence in preparedness posture (Kano &Bourque, 2008).  
The first section of this chapter reviews the theoretical considerations grounding 
the study and considers other literature supporting the approach. The next section on the 





of the federal and industry guidelines for hospital preparedness as well as a snapshot of 
the general state of the U.S. hospital system’s preparedness for disasters. The subsequent 
sections of this chapter consider the specific types of incidents mentioned above as well 
as the role that preparedness coordinators and resource base play in an individual hospital 
facility’s preparedness posture. The literature review then considers relevant general 
issues. The final section of this chapter integrates the results of the literature review and 
identifies the specific gaps in the literature that point to the need for the present research 
study.  
A further note on this chapter concerns the role of the DPDC and the information 
presented in this chapter. This chapter focuses on those key tasks, tactics, techniques, 
procedures, and indicators of hospital preparedness that could potentially be influenced 
by the employment of a DPDC, such as planning, coordinating access to medical 
countermeasures, staff training and education, surge capacity management, 
decontamination capabilities, and infection control. 
The following databases were searched to identify the literature: Academic Search 
Premier, Business Search Premier, Criminal Justice Periodicals, ProQuest Dissertations 
and Theses, Political Science: A SAGE Full-Text Collection, and ProQuest Central. The 
following keywords were used: chemical terrorism, hospital preparedness, hospital 
preparedness for CBRN incidents, hospital preparedness for mass casualty events, 
hospital evacuation planning, hospital surge capacity, hospital disaster planning, 





Google Scholar assisted Walden application was used to identify key resources and 
articles.  
Theoretical Considerations  
Complexity theory of adaptive systems for health care and hospital management 
during disasters is described by Hilhorst (2003) and reframed by O’Sullivan et al. (2012). 
It provides a clear and concise model for describing the internal and external 
connectedness and qualities required for general hospital preparedness, preparedness for 
specific catastrophic events, and the specific dimension of control as detailed by Comfort 
(2007). There is a dearth of literature outlining the gaps in hospital preparedness and also 
regarding those policies and activities that may correlate with overall hospital 
preparedness. While the literature identifies both the potential correlates to hospital 
preparedness and the assessed gaps, many hospitals and health care facilities remain in 
marginal states of preparedness (Niska & Shimzu, 2011). Hospitals are complex entities, 
and by extension, so is the preparedness of a hospital or hospital system. One of the gaps 
that has not been assessed is the management and supervision of such programs and the 
potential affect it may have on the previously identified gaps. It is through the lens of 
complexity theory that this paper attempts to analyze this phenomenon.  
Complexity theory describes to the organization, interaction, and operation of 
complex systems. A complex system is characterized by several independent elements 
that continuously interact, spontaneously organize, and then reorganize themselves into 





Greenhalgh (2001), a complex system is a collection of individual agents with freedom to 
act autonomously of one another. However, those individual agents’ actions are 
interconnected and are able to change the context of other agents.  
Complexity is characterized by: (a) a large number of similar but independent 
elements or agents; (b) persistent movement and responses by these elements to other 
agents; (c) adaptiveness so that the system adjusts to new situations to ensure survival; 
(d) self-organization, in which order in the system forms spontaneously; (e) local rules 
that apply to each agent; and (f) progression in complexity so that over time the system 
becomes larger and more sophisticated. Another way to describe this complexity is 
through the operation and technical lens of Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity, which 
defines the complexity of an entity through the amount of information it takes to describe 
it (Satell, 2013). An example of this is describing the number googol in exponential terms 
(i.e. 1100) rather that writing it out in long notion with 100 zeros.  
Systems characterized by constant change, especially those that have cross-cutting 
inter- and intra-organizational boundaries, cannot be analyzed without considering the 
dynamics influencing operations (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Cilliers, 1998). Framing 
the disaster operation of a health care organization in terms of complexity recognizes the 
discreet interactions between components and between a given system and its 
environment (Coiera, 2011), and is now recognized as an essential lens through which to 





Hospitals and health care systems are complex, adaptive systems. The level of 
complexity is increased during disasters. During disasters and in steady state operations, 
hospitals are largely dependent on productive interactions (Plsik & Wilson, 2001). 
However, the organization and management of the delivery of services during a disaster 
does not always reflect this. In a disaster or emergent situation with significant health 
impacts, the complexity and priority of the interaction within a hospital or health system 
increase, for example, the steady state interactions between the emergency department 
and surgical department change. This could take the form of elective surgeries being 
canceled to accommodate incoming patients or the emergency department allowing 
surgeons to participate in triage and treatment to ensure the most urgent and efficacious 
selection of patients for surgery.  
According to Satell (2013), individuals with the ability to identify and manage 
these complexities are the most effective for their organizations. However, as it relates to 
disaster managers in hospitals, no measures have been taken to assess this. There is 
evidence that disaster managers in other settings are well suited to manage complex 
systems, including those in schools and school systems and public health departments. 
Kano and Bourque (2008) and Avery & Zabriskie-Timmerman (2006) found that with 
complex systems, a DPDC significantly increased preparedness activities, including: 
training, exercises, allocation of funding, and general feeling of preparedness by staff 





make an excellent framework on which to build an assessment of preparedness and the 
effect of DPDC in hospitals (O’Sullivan et al., 2012). 
Structure and Influencers of Hospital Preparedness  
Much of how hospital preparedness is currently viewed has been shaped by the 
events of September 11, 2001, which was a catalyst for a resurgent look at and the 
restructuring of American public health and health care preparedness. There are four 
main influences that shape hospital prepared and shape the conversation about this topic: 
The Joint Commission, the Executive Branch and the President, Congress, and the 
Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response.  
The Joint Commission 
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO) or Joint Commission (TJC) sets standards for health care organizations and 
issues accreditation to those organizations that meet those standards. TJC is an 
independent, not-for-profit organization established in 1951 to provide voluntary 
accreditation to hospitals (Sauer, McCarthy, Knebel, & Brewster, 2009). TJC 
accreditation is voluntary but extremely important because it provides a mechanism to 
show the facility complies with all conditions of participation for Medicare. Which 
means it is able to receive reimbursement for services rendered to Medicare and 





TJC has organized emergency preparedness within a set of all-hazards standards 
that provide for a so-called safe “environment of care” (Sauer et al., 2009). The standards 
are built for hospitals and are incident specific with provides a beneficial resource for 
hospital preparedness planners. They are based on the comprehensive emergency 
management model, and have undergone three rounds of revision since 2001. The 
guidance is focused on: managing consequences to, providing safe and effective patient 
care during an emergency, clearly defining staff roles, training those roles and 
responsibilities; and sustaining staff competencies over time. There are six focus areas for 
hospitals to demonstrate they have proper plans and response mechanisms prepare for, 
mitigate the effect of, respond to and recovery from a disaster.  
The Executive Branch of the Federal Government 
In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush issued HSPD-5 (Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive) which established the Department of Homeland Security 
as the Cabinet-level secretariat as well as call for the development of comprehensive 
National Response Plan (NPR) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
(Sauer et al., 2009). These two documents provide a national-level all-hazard response 
framework to respond to and management disasters. Also contained in HSPD-5 is the 
mandate that hospitals comply with NIMS and develop disaster preparedness programs 
and plans than comply with the NRP. President Bush also issues HSPD-7 which 
identified critical infrastructure priorities and named public health and health care a 





Services as the lead Federal agency for mitigating risk and protecting public health and 
health care infrastructure.   
In 2003, HSPD-8 was issued designating hospital and emergency departments as 
emergency response providers (Sauer et al., 2009). Following the issuance of HSPD-8, 
HSPD-10 charged hospitals increase its focus on traditional disasters and terrorist threats 
as well as to prepare for the threat of threats from terrorist use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, especially biological agents. In 2007, HSPD-21 the National Strategy for 
Public Health and Medical Preparedness was issued. It called for a multi-sector, cross-
functional approach to the health care preparedness. It also established the concept of 
resilient communities and defined health care preparedness as it the context of 
community resilience.  
Congress 
After 9/11, Congress passed to successive pieces of legislation, the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (Bioterrorism Act) which was replaced by 
the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness (PAHPH) (Sauer et al, 2009). The 
Bioterrorism Act and PAHPA established what is now designated as the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response (ASPR) within DHHS. The 
Bioterrorism Act called for state and local governments to increase resource expenditure 
and allocation to become better prepared for bioterrorism and other public health 





state and local governments and other entities (grant eligible) to develop and implement 
emergency management plans and standards develop by DHHS/ASPR.   
DHHS and the Hospital Preparedness Program 
As previously mentioned, DHHS and ASPR are designated the lead Federal 
agencies for public health and health care preparedness and response. ASPR administers 
the Hospital Preparedness program, which has had substantial influence over hospital 
preparedness in two ways: 1) All funding for HPP be administered by state health 
departments so that community response entities work together to develop community 
capabilities; and 2) HPP uses a capabilities-based model which requires recipients to 
develop and demonstrate specific capabilities in order to receive funding (Sauer et al., 
2009). These shifts from early granting structures and preparedness has resulted in a more 
objective way to measure capabilities across the sector, and provide a greater mechanism 
for community-wide and regional cooperation and collaboration of hospitals.  
The goal of the Hospital HPP is to enhance the ability of hospitals and health care 
systems to prepare for and respond to bio-terror attacks on civilians and other public 
health emergencies, including pandemic influenza and natural disasters. All 50 states, as 
well as the District of Columbia, the nation’s three largest municipalities (Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and New York City), the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern 
Mariana Islands, three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), 





funding through grants, partnerships, and cooperative agreements since 2002 (Trust for 
America’s Health, 2014; ASPR, 2013).  
Past priorities include improving bed and personnel surge capacity, 
decontamination capabilities, isolation capacity, pharmaceutical supplies, training, 
education, drills, and exercises (Macintyre &Barbera, 2009).  Current HPP priorities 
include strengthening hospital capabilities in the areas of interoperable communication 
systems, bed tracking, personnel management, fatality management planning, and 
hospital evacuation planning. In order to provide focus for grantee acquisition and use of 
funds, HPP defines eight key capabilities needed for hospitals and health care systems to 
effectively and efficiently prepare, respond, and recover from disasters with health 
implications or public health and medical emergencies. The focus areas provide grantees 
areas that can be assessed and resources allocated in order to increase preparedness 
related activities, increase community engagement, enhance or develop capabilities, 






1. Health care system preparedness  
2. Health care system recovery 
3. Emergency operations coordination 
4. Fatality management  
5. Information sharing  
6. Medical surge  
7. Responder health and safety 
8. Volunteer management 
Figure 1: Hospital preparedness key capabilities: ASPR 2012. This figure highlights the 
key functions association with crisis management and disaster response for hospitals and 






The Status of U.S. Hospital Preparedness  
Hospital disaster preparedness and resilience is a comprehensive concept derived 
from existing disaster resilience frameworks. It has four key domains: hospital safety; 
disaster preparedness and resources; continuity of essential medical services; recovery 
and adaptation. These domains were categorized according to four criteria, namely, 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity (Zhong, Clark, Hou, Lang & 
Fitzgerald, 2013). The purpose of this paper is examine the correlation between overall 
hospital preparedness as well as preparedness for special disasters, including pandemic 
disease, CBRN/WMD/HAZMAT events, mass casualty events, and infrastructure failure. 
This section provides a snapshot of the current state of hospital preparedness for the 
above classes of disasters as well as overall preparedness. However, it is worth noting 
that because of manner in which the HHS, NAPH, the Joint Commission, and other 
aggregators of hospitals preparedness, there is a significant lag in reporting. Much of the 
actual data on hospital preparedness used for this study is circa 2007 and 2008; however, 
it was reported between 2011 and 2013.  
There are general measures of general hospital disaster preparedness. These 
measures are and prescribed standards are dictates from the HPP and accreditation 
organizations such as the Joint Commission (Kaji, Langford, & Lewis, 2008). While 
these standards are given standards, there have been very few scientifically rigorous 
methods developed to actually assess the overall preparedness of a given health care 





study. However, it understood that at present, there are major gaps in preparedness both 
on a very basic and general level as well as for those special incidents (Niska & Shimzu, 
2011).  
Assessed Gaps  
The most recent and current assessment of hospital preparedness was conducted 
in 2008 by Niska & Shimzu. For their analysis Niska & Shimzu used the data collected 
from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS) which included an 
Emergency Preparedness Supplements (Niska & Shimzu, 2011). According to the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the NHAMCS is designed to collect data on 
the utilization and provision of ambulatory care services in hospital emergency and 
outpatient departments. Findings are based on a national sample of visits to the 
emergency departments and outpatient departments of non-institutional general and 
short-stay hospitals (CDC, 2013). 
In survey-year 2008, the U.S. Department of Health and Humans Services (HHS) 
included a Pandemic and Emergency Response supplement to the survey designed to 
provide an assessment of the preparedness of both hospital and allied health facilities’ 
preparedness for pandemics, technological, and natural disasters (CDC, 2008). The 
NHAMCS was administered on-site at each participating hospital by field assessor 
employed by the U.S. Census Bureau. The supplement in question consisted of an eight-
page self-administered questionnaire with a total of 112 data points (Niska & Shimzu, 





hospital’s emergency response plan. The global sample of hospital consisted of 5,212 in-
scope ambulatory medical facilities. The study had as sample population 395 and was 
selected using a multistage probability sampling design involving samples of geographic 
primary sampling units and hospitals with emergency departments (ED) or outpatient 
departments within those units. 
The keying findings of the study were separated into key areas which included: 
mutual aid agreements, cooperative training, funding, and access to preparedness related 
resources, planning, and training (Niska & Shimzu, 2011). The following findings are the 
most germane to the topics being assessed in the current study: 
• Nearly all hospitals had emergency response plans that specifically addressed 
at least one or some of the following hazards: CBRN/HAZMAT, natural 
disasters/loss of critical infrastructure, mass casualty events, and pandemic 
disease (Niska & Shimzu 2011).  However, only about 80 percent had plans 
for Radiological events, and even fewer had mass casualty plans that included 
plans and procedures for explosive or incendiary events. Further, less that 70 
percent had plans that spanned the entire range of hazards.  
• Nearly all hospitals in the sample participated cooperative planning with one 
of the following entities: state and local emergency management; other 
hospitals; emergency medical services; state and local public health; state and 
local law enforcement HAZMAT teams; and the Federal Bureau of 





planning and engagement with the first six entities listed, just over 60 percent 
had coordination with local HAZMAT teams and less than 20 percent with the 
FBI. Further, approximately 16 percent had done planning or engagement 
with all eight (Niska & Shimzu 2011).  
• Approximately 85 percent of hospitals in the sample population had done the 
preliminary laydown for Mutual Aid Agreements and Memoranda of 
Understanding with other hospitals that included items such as transfers of 
patients and sharing of supplies and staff (Niska & Shimzu 2008). However, 
less than half had such agreements with burn centers for victims of explosive 
or incendiary incidents. Additionally, less that 20 percent of these agreements 
had been signed or put into effect.  
• In 2008, just over 80 percent of hospitals had conducted internal disaster 
drills, however, only half had conducted such drills with external partners, e.g. 
EMS, other hospitals, fire departments, etc. (Niska & Shimzu 2008). Hospital 
drill scenarios overwhelmingly focused on general situations. Less than 70 
percent of hospitals had done disasters drill the focused on mass 
decontamination of patients, however, only about 40 percent hand focused 
decontamination of aerosolized biological agents. Sixty percent of hospitals 
had executed drills for pandemic or epidemic disease incidents; however, less 
than 40 percent had included management of delayed onset disease and even 





distribution of mass prophylaxis to hospital staff, patients, or the community 
and just over half had done specific chemical events.  Approximately 30 
percent of all hospital had conducted drill focusing on incendiary or explosive 
incident, and roughly 20 percent had conducted drills relating to nuclear or 
radiological incidents.  
• Between 2002 and 2007, roughly 25 percent of hospitals received greater than 
$150,000 in federal preparedness funding, roughly 20 percent received greater 
than $75,000 but less than $150,000, and roughly a quarter had received more 
than zero but less than $75,000. About 5.2 percent received no funding, and 
over 25 percent of hospitals were unaware if they had received any federal 
preparedness funding (Niska & Shimzu 2011). 
Role of the Designated Hospital Preparedness Coordinator 
The role of DPDC within the hospital has become a much scrutinized and debated 
topic in the light of disasters such as 9/11, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and the Boston 
Marathon Bombing (Russell & William, 2008).  However, little scientific rigor has been 
applied to understand the effect they have on overall hospital preparedness activities or 
the overall operation of the hospital during a disaster or large-scale emergency. Some 
studies show anecdotal evidences that DPDCs provide a boost to pre-disaster 
preparedness activities. There have also been stories of important role play by the DPDC 





real-life case studies which show the link between this position, preparedness, and 
emergency operations.  
The overall hypothesis of this paper is that the DPDC has a positive effect on 
hospital preparedness. However, it is limited to a specific set of tasks and activities, 
including: training and exercising, internal planning, cooperative planning, medical 
material management, surge capacity and volunteer management, and specific incident 
response procedures (e.g. CBRN event, pandemics and disease outbreaks, and 
infrastructure failure.   
Roles and Responsibilities 
At the most basic level, the responsibility of the DPDC is to ensure the hospital 
emergency management program is properly staffed, resourced, and funded to meet and 
comply with regulatory and legal requirements, as well as to ensure the safe of hospital 
staff as they provide services to the community during disasters or crisis situation 
(Russell & Williams, 2008).  Hicks, Christian, & Sprung (2011) highlight this position in 
the light of its operation components, detailing that this individual should be delegated 
the overarching authority to implement processes and procedures that ensure continuity, 
crisis management, surge capacity, and interface with internal and external response 
partner (Hicks, Christian, & Sprung, 2011). They further elaborate that the hospital or 
health system’s clinical staff should act in their roles to provide the DPDC with the need 





Based on the above position description, the following activities are those for 
which that DPDC has oversight and a high level of influence or control (Russell & 
Williams, 2008; Hick, Christian, & Sprung, 2011): 
Roles and Responsibilities 
• Serves as the POC for: 
o Hospital-wide and department specific emergency action planning 
o developing, scheduling, evaluating, and executing drills and exercises 
o training, capacity, capability and competency building and maintenance 
o purchase and logistical management of disaster response supplies and 
medical materiel 
• Develop comprehensive plans for internal crises and utility and infrastructure 
failure 
• Act as Incident Coordinator during crisis events; execute the overarching 
goals and objective of the hospital/health system executives 
• Serve as liaison with local, state, and federal agencies relating to disaster 
preparedness and response. 
• Coordinates and manages volunteer, surge capacity, and disaster space 
management programs 
Figure 1. Roles and responsibilities of a hospital preparedness emergency manager or 
hospital preparedness coordinator. 
 
Financial Landscape and Emphasis  
The HPP provide grant funding for hospitals to enhance capabilities. As 
previously stated, HPP has eight core capabilities that hospitals and health systems are 
advised to address in order to have the basic level of preparedness for disasters. Among 
these is Emergency Operation Coordination. In the annual survey of HPP grant 
recipients, grant awardees reported the Emergency Operation Coordination was among 
the top for capabilities that hospital need to enhance (ASPR, 2012). Additionally, 
Emergency Operations Coordination assistance was third on the list of technical 





required skill sets to increase hospital preparedness. In 2012, 13 percent of all HPP 
awarded grant-dollars were spent on personnel (ASPR, 2012).  However, only 1 percent 
was allocated for Emergency Operation Coordination.  
Current Thinking 
As stated previously, there is not a large body of evidence in favor of or against 
the employment of DPDCs. Few studies have been done to identify the effect on disaster 
coordinator on their given entities. However, those that have been done to statistically 
validate this relationship show a positive correlative relationship, they include one in the 
context of the emergency department, one study in a school setting, and one in the 
context of public health departments. In 2007, the National Public Health and Hospital 
Institute (NPHHI) found that of 60-NAPH hospitals survey, 25 percent had fulltime 
DPCCs, and concluded that they may be critical in increasing and maintaining hospital 
preparedness (Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 2007). In 2003, Gaushe-Hill, Schmitz, & 
Lewis all studied the emergency departments in the U.S. and their level of preparedness 
to deal with pediatric emergencies. They found that hospitals that had a designated 
physician and nurses as pediatric emergency coordinators had higher preparedness 
scores, which included disaster-related plans and equipment (Gaushe-Hill, Schmitz, & 
Lewis, 2003). Kano & Bourque (2008) found that schools in Los Angeles County who 
had access to a DPDC, on at least as part-time basis, reported higher levels of 
preparedness activities and staff confidence in overall preparedness. Additional 





preparedness/disaster coordinators, of note is the study from University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center in 2009. Additionally, in 2009, Avery & Zabriskie-Timmerman found 
that health departments with a full-time DPDC were strongly correlated with higher 
levels of preparedness activities.  
Hospital Preparedness for CBRN and Mass Casualty Events 
This section provides a look at hospital preparedness for chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear and mass casualty events. This section focuses on those key 
tasks or indicators of hospital preparedness for CBRN and mass casualty events that are 
influenced by the employment of a DPDC, such as: accessing medical countermeasures, 
staff training and education, and decontamination.  
CBRN and mass casualty event can be either intentional or accidental. In the 
context of intentional release, CBRN terrorism is the intentional use or release of 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agent as a weapon by terrorist organization 
or individual for political, economic, or social gain (Department of Labor, n.d.). 
Accidental release of CBRN agents are those that occur as a result of unintentional 
action, disasters, or negligence.  CBRN agents include items such as chlorine, sarin, 
mustard agent, anthrax, ricin, cobalt-63, cesium-137, nuclear power plant accident, or an 
improvised nuclear device. Mass casualty events span the range of convention and non-
conventional incidents and natural and man-made disasters including explosive or 






Preparedness for these types of events consists of many other elements this 
includes: staff training, specialized expertise, and coordination with entities outside the 
hospital, surge capacity, specialized equipment, and the ability to identify and treat 
exposures to such agents (Bennett, 2006; Wetter, Daniell & Tresser, 2001). While a 
majority of early research, publication, and efforts focused a great deal on training, 
equipment, and surge capacity, a great deal of current research focuses on weather 
clinicians are perceive themselves and their facility as prepared for a chemical or 
biological attacks and how well current procedures work in rendering care and medical 
management of victims.  
Planning, Exercises, and Training 
As seen in Niska & Shimzu (2011), most hospitals have plans that address both 
chemical and biological terrorist events. However, only about 80% percent had plans for 
radiological and nuclear incidents, and only about 79% had plans for explosive or 
incendiary events. However, as it relates training, when surveyed, only 69 percent of 
hospitals reported participated in a drill focusing on decontamination of patients from a 
chemical incident, and only 55 percent had done exercises focusing on industrial 
chemical accidents (Niska & Shimzu, 2011). Additionally, only 42 percent of hospitals 
had participated in drills that exercised decontamination of aerosolized biological agents.  
Further, only 39 percent of hospitals had done drill that focused on delayed disease onset 
and even fewer (32 percent) had practiced the mass distribution of vaccine and medical 





participated in drills with training driven by explosive or incendiary scenarios, and 18 
percent had participated drills featuring radiological or nuclear incident response.  
As it related to staff training, Greenberg (2011) report that roughly 70 percent of 
emergency department directors reported having at least one hour of classroom training 
relating cholinesterase antagonist and chemical nerve agents within the year previous to 
the study, and 22 percent reported having had such training in the previous two years 
prior to the survey. However, disaster drills focusing on these agents were far less 
frequently reported. Roughly 7 percent reported such a drill within the previous year, and 
only 30 percent reported executing such a drill in the previous three years. Additionally, 
28 percent reported not having ever taken part in such a drill. Of those who had taken part 
in drills, only less than 5 percent were very confident that their drill experiences had 
prepared them for a real MCI, and more than half were either not confident or only 
slightly confident in the effectiveness of their drills. These findings are similar to those of 
Hood, Fernandez-Flack & Larranaga (2010) where it was found that the teams subjected 
to the mock decontamination simulation had on participated in one drill in the past three 
years leading up to the survey (Hood, Fernandez-Flack & Larranaga, 2010) 
Decontamination 
A key capability and a point concern during all CBRN and HAZMAT events is 
the ability of a hospital staff to control contamination and efficiently and effectively 
decontaminate patients – meaning they reduce the level of skin surface contamination 





have shown that hospitals have much of the needed equipment and facilities to conduct 
decontamination. This is in part due to the large sums of money that have been provided 
through HPP granting as well as independent expenditures of health systems and 
individual hospitals (Bennett, 2006). Bennett (2006) found that of the population he 
surveyed, greater than 75 percent of the respondents reported having what they 
considered to adequate decontamination facilities for victims exposed to chemical or 
biological contaminants. Paralleling these results, a 2011 study of the 15-largest 
metropolitan areas in the country shows an even greater level of preparedness relating to 
facilities and equipment related to decontamination of patients. The survey of metro 
emergency department directors form the 94 percent had robust facilities to conduct 
emergency decontamination of victims of chemical or biological events (Greenberg, 
2012).  
However adequately equipped hospitals maybe, it has been found that hospital-
based decontamination teams (HBDT) are capable of executing the tasks assigned. In a 
2010 study of HBDTs found that teams using running water decontamination systems 
had not properly followed standard decontamination guidance from the Operational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which included: lack of use of a 
decontaminating agent (e.g. soap or a .05 percent per chlorate solution) and insufficient 
showering and decontamination times (Hood, Fernandez-Flack & Larranaga, 2010).  
When looked at under black light and compared pre- and post-drill, the mock victims 





stimulant had not been washed away or hydrolyzed but spread over a greater area of the 
body.  
Medical Materiel Management 
An additional concern hospital is the medical management of patient post chem-
bio event. Of key concern is access to drugs and equipment needed for treatment. This 
involves the identification, procurement, and administration of chemical agent antidotes, 
antiviral drugs, antitoxins, and antibiotics as well as other assets and resources. This is 
complicated by the for profit models of hospitals. Hospitals usually operate on a just-it-
time model, which ensures that they have on-hand supplies of need medications and 
supplies (Phalen, 2013). They do not, as a matter of course, stockpile supplies and 
medication unless there is an imminent threat. In an effort to deal with such issues, the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services through the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention established the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), and within the SNS is 
the program called CHEMPACK (HHS, 2013).  
The SNS and the CHEMPACK program are funded by the federal government 
(HHS, 2013). SNS stockpiles vaccines, antiviral drugs, antitoxins and other resources, 
including perishable medical supplies and mechanical. The program can deploy an array 
of medical countermeasure or equipment to anywhere in the country in twelve hours. 
Additionally, the CHEMPACK program pre-stage chemical anti-dotes at many large 
metropolitan hospitals because of the need to administer in a timely fashion incident to 





pharmacies, and other health care facilities about these programs and the capabilities 
offered. However, when emergency department directors were asked, more than a quarter 
reported having never even hearing of the Strategic National Stockpile and another 25 
percent reported having heard the name but were unfamiliar with the function of the 
program (Greenberg, 2011). 
In application, as it concerns hospital planning for stockpiling, accessing, and 
administering MCM, the literature has been pretty consistent. Bennett (2006) found that 
greater than 55 percent of hospital in Mississippi had plans and supplies to administer 
chemical agent antidote, antivirals, and antibiotics to both patients and staff. Kaji & 
Lewis (2006) had similar finding when they surveyed the hospital in Los Angeles 
County. They found that 51 per of hospitals surveyed had stockpiles of MCM and plans 
to administer them in response chemical and biological events (Kaji & Lewis, 2006). 
While Bennett did not assess the accessibility of mechanical vents, his study did suggest 
that these a key pieces of equipment (Bennett, 2006). Conversely, Kaji & Lewis found 
that fewer than one-third of hospital had access to 6 or more mechanical ventilators and 
were unaware of how to surge these numbers if the need arose. Finally, as it relates to 
planning and administration of MCM, Bennett found that fewer than half of the hospital 
surveyed had plans to provide MCM to the families of staff members.  
Perception of and Willingness to Respond 
CBRN Events Staff training has been shown to be very important indicator of 





respond to incidences of chemical and biological terrorist incidents (Schur, Beck, & 
Meuller, 2004; Grimes & Mendias, 2011). In an informal panel discussion of emergency 
department personnel individual expressed that they would be more apt to report to work 
or stay at work to respond biological attacks or chemical terrorist events if they had 
extensive and on-going training with these types of scenarios and personal protective 
equipment. However, based on the finding of Niska & Shimzu (2011) and Greenberg 
(2011) less than 70 percent of hospitals had done disasters drill the focused on mass 
decontamination of patients, however, only about 40 percent hand focused 
decontamination of aerosolized biological agents. Sixty percent of hospitals had executed 
drills for pandemic or epidemic disease incidents; however, less than 40 percent had 
included management of delayed onset disease and even fewer, had included scenario 
elements focusing on mass vaccination or distribution of mass prophylaxis to hospital 
staff, patients, or the community and just over half had done specific chemical events. 
While training has shown a correlation with perception of readiness and 
willingness of staff members report, as seen earlier in the chapter, there remains a 
question about how effective or the perceived effective of training and exercises and the 
perceived ability and willingness to respond hospitals ability respond and the 
effectiveness of efforts during a chemical and biological terrorist event. Greenberg (2011) 
found of those they survey, who had taken part in drills, and  less than 5 percent were 





than half were either not confident or only slightly confident in the effectiveness of their 
drills.  
An additional topic that found in the literature dealing with willingness to report 
to work and respond focused on family obligations and family readiness, especially as it 
relates to dependent children. Barnett, Balicer, Bolgett et al (2005) point out that the 
safety and well-being of family members is a central concern for health professionals. 
Anxiety over their safety and welfare can significantly impact a worker's sense of 
personal control, and has been identified as a significant contributor to one’s risk 
perceptions (Barnett, Balicer, Bolgett et al., 2005). However, as pointed out by Bennett, 
only roughly a quarter of hospitals had written plans to provide services families’ or 
workers.  
Hospital Preparedness for Pandemics and Disease Outbreaks 
In light of the 2009 outbreak of Pandemic Avian Influenza (H1N1), much of 
literature regarding hospital preparedness for pandemic disease focuses on this topic. An 
additionally driver of pandemic preparedness was the outbreak of Sudden Acute 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome (SARS). However limited the scope of the scenario, the 
activities and intended outcomes are the same: the ability to provide effective service in 
the event of a mass outbreak of disease. In this way, pandemic preparedness is not all that 
different from bioterrorism preparedness.  
In pandemics, hospitals are the on the frontlines of caring for the population 





at hospital response. The studies found: a lack adequate health care worker training 
programs, and lack stockpiled personal protective equipment and other necessary medical 
equipment, such as ventilators (Redman, 2010). Other identified deficiencies include a 
lack of around‐the‐clock infection prevention coverage, little‐to‐no capacity for a surge in 
the need for negative‐pressure facilities and/or for health care workers, failure to 
participate in hospital preparedness drills that involve an infectious disease scenario, and 
no prioritization plan for allocation of limited doses of antiviral medications. At the 
individual hospital level, DPDC can affect several activities that contribute to greater 
levels of preparedness, either directly or indirectly. Those activities include: planning 
training and exercising, surge capacity management, and staff readiness and incentives.   
Plans, Training, and Exercises 
As seen in Niska & Shimzu’s study of the U.S. hospital, most hospitals had done 
planning for disease outbreaks (Niska & Shimzu, 2011). However, only 40 percent had 
conducted exercises or drills simulating conditions of pandemic or mass disease 
outbreaks. These numbers are similar to those found after the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic. In a 
study of Atlanta metro hospitals, of the 26 hospital emergency departments in the survey 
over 24 had plans for pandemics and major disease outbreaks. However, more than half 






Surge Capacity Management 
Surge capacity is defined as the ability to obtain adequate staff, supplies and 
equipment, structures and systems to provide sufficient care to meet immediate needs of 
an influx of patients following a large-scale incident or disaster (Adams, 2009). Surge 
capacity spans a continuum of care across conventional (usual spaces, staff and 
resources), contingency (functionally equivalent care using non-traditional patient care 
space, staff and resources) and crisis (sufficiency of care in a scarce resource setting) 
(Sprung et al, 2010; Hicks, Christian, & Sprung, 2010). Surge capability includes 
continuity of operations (COOP) and crisis planning, staff management, resource 
acquisition and allocation, space management, and medical materiel management (Niska 
& Shimzu, 2011).  
Hospital COOP refers to the ability of the hospital to ensure that the infrastructure 
that supports normal steady-state operations is available to support crisis operations, even 
if a key component of that infrastructure is missing or degraded. As previously noted, 
Niska & Shimzu (2011) found that the vast majority of hospitals had undertaken some 
level of disaster or crisis management planning, greater than 99 percent. However, as it 
relates to COOP planning, Niska & Shimzu about 85 percent of hospital had plans for the 
sustainment of operation in crisis and potentially austere situations (Niska & Shimzu, 
2011). These finding are echoed in smaller scale studies in Los Angeles conducted by 





The second focus of surge capacity deals with effective managing and allocating 
the skill sets of the available workforce. A great deal of research has focused on the 
ability of hospital to effective manage its staff during pandemics and disease outbreaks. 
Much of the researched has focused availability of trained personnel and the ability to 
share those personnel across facilities and across hospital coalitions. However, one of the 
planning assumptions that should be made in the full spectrum of events discussed in this 
paper is that all hospital facilities will be constrained by resource and personnel.  Niska 
and Shimzu (2008) found that roughly only about 60 percent of hospital had plans in 
place to share health professionals with other agencies with the community. A further 
finding by Niska and Shimzu, which was supported by Rambhia et al., just over half were 
equipped for the advanced registration of volunteer health professionals (Niska & 
Shimzu, 2011; Rambhia et al., 2012). Additionally, they found that roughly 60 percent of 
hospitals had made planning assumptions for employee absenteeism during outbreaks or 
providing incentives, such as child care, for those who show-up for work during the event 
(Niska & Shimzu, 2011). Taking a deeper look at staff members, willingness to report 
(WTR) is of central concern and how hospital can increase the willingness of their staffs 
to report for duty during widespread disease outbreaks. As seen previously in this paper, 
only 60 percent of hospital workers were willing to report to work in response to a CBRN 
event (Balicer et al., 2011).  As it relates to pandemic disease and widespread disease 
outbreaks, Balicer and colleagues found that roughly 72 percent of hospital workers were 





(Balicer et al., 2010). These results were modified by the incentives offered by the 
hospital, including: childcare, medical countermeasures, and providing personal 
protective equipment (Balicer et al., 2010; Balicer et al., 2011).  
Another area of surge capacity focus is equipment, space management, and 
resource allocation. Niska & Shimzu (2011) and Rambhia et al. (2011) found that 
approximately 90 percent of all hospitals had plans and agreements with other facilities to 
share beds. However, only around 80 percent had agreements to share equipment and 
supplies across systems or in regional coalitions (Niska & Shimzu, 2011; Rhanbia et al., 
2011). Niska & Shimzu found that 90 percent of hospital had plans to implement 
isolation procedures in negative pressure rooms. However, only 70 percent of hospital 
had plans to establish beds with staffing and equipment in non-clinical spaces, and even 
fewer had plans to open up decommissioned areas of the hospital to accommodate 
increased demand for care, 49 percent; while only half of all hospitals had plans to use 
inpatient units to augment intensive care units (Niska & Shimzu, 2011). In allocating and 
prioritizing these resources, Niska & Shimzu found that 86 percent of hospital had plans 
for cancelling elective procedures and admissions, 70 percent had developed triage 
procedures for ICU, while only 64 percent had coordinated regionally to implement crisis 
standards of care for pandemics and disease outbreaks, and only 43 percent of hospitals 
had plans for implementing augmented standards for the initiation and removal of 





Medical Materiel Management 
The other area where DPDC can affect levels of preparedness and activities 
associated with medical materiel management, this includes managing internal stockpiles 
of pharmaceutical and equipment and access to outside sources of equipment including 
access to state and federal stockpiles. As previously reported, 80 percent of hospital had 
plans for sharing equipment and supplies with other hospitals (Niska & Shimzu, 2011; 
Rambhia et al., 2011). However, in a resource constrained environment, the planning 
assumption should be that such mutual aid pacts may not work because everyone will 
need the same things (Adida, Delaurentis, & Lawley, 2011). An additional factor 
complicating the idea of sharing and stockpiling of medical materiel is cost. Most 
hospitals operate on a just-it-time model, purchasing and ordering items as the reach a 
minimum threshold amount (Phalen, 2013). Stockpiling of pharmaceutical is often 
limited to that which the hospital needs for normal operations, and equipment and 
supplies, such as PPE, is stocked for acute situations but not for long drawn out events 
such as a pandemic (Hashikura &Junko, 2009). This also extends to major pieces of 
equipment, such as ventilators. In a small-scale study, Kaji & Lewis found that less than a 
third the hospital in LA County had access to six or more ventilators (Kaji & Lewis, 
2006).  
Hospital Preparedness for Loss of Function and Infrastructure Failure 
Hospitals are systems within a system that are built and rely upon the operation of 





include transportation, water, power, gas, and climate control. When these systems are 
disrupted, hospitals have limited options to respond to and mitigate the effects, especially 
if the disruptions are prolonged. Because of hospitals reliance on external systems to 
function, they can rely of system redundancies, fully or partially evacuate the facility, or 
shut-down all together. Managing and coordinating the planning and execution of these 
options can be greatly affected by DPDCs, especially external coordination and 
evacuation (Russell & William, 2008) 
Concrete data could not be found related to hospital redundancy for loss of 
function or infrastructure failure, including: back-up generation of power, access to fuel, 
back-up water, etc. However, Niska & Shimzu (2011) found that 95 percent of hospital 
had emergency evacuation plans and roughly 80 percent had plans for large patient 
movements within the hospital and between hospitals. Nearly 90 percent of all hospitals 
had MOUs with one or more hospitals to accept adult patient, however, only half had 
plans with one or more hospitals for the transfer of children. As stated, the ability to 
coordinate evacuations and diversion activities is a key to efficient disaster response. 
Niska & Shimzu found that 85 percent of hospital participated in regional communication 
systems that tracked ED bed capacity; and 80, 70, and 65 percent participated in systems 
that tracked adult, child, and neonatal ICU beds respectively. 
Conclusion 
As stated previously in this paper, the purpose of this study is to identify if there 





preparedness reported. However, there is no literature that provides a statistical or 
scientifically verified data in this context. The literature review relied on drawing 
parallels to studies done on disaster coordinator in schools, emergency departments, and 
public health departments which find that such individuals increase preparedness related 
activities, which serve a proxy for measure levels of preparedness (Gaushe-Hill, Schmitz, 
& Lewis, 200; Kano & Bourque, 2008; Avery & Zibreski-Timmermen, 2009;).  
The theoretical framework for the current study is Complexity Theory. The 
literature illustrates the hospitals are complex systems that rely function of both internal 
and external systems, especially during disaster and crises. Complexity theory describes 
to the organization, interaction, and operation of complex systems. Hospitals and health 
care systems are complex adaptive systems. The level of complexity is increased during 
disasters. The literate also shows that entities that employ individuals with the ability to 
identify and manage these complexities are the most effective for their organizations. 
This is central to the design of this study.  
While limited, the literature also shows that there is a significant belief that the 
position of DPDC has a significant impact on hospital preparedness. However, no 
statistical data exists to provide a definitive correlative link between hospital 
preparedness activities and the employment of such personnel. However, a limited body 
of evidence provides a statistical link between disaster coordinators and preparedness 





health departments.  These quantitative studies show that disaster coordinator have some 
effect of the preparedness of the entities in which they work. 
The literature also shows that within the areas of focus hospitals and hospital 
staffs engagement in preparedness activities at a strategic-level. However, at the 
operational-level, many hospitals are not engaging in those activities that specifically 
address key capabilities. These activities including: scenario/incident-specific planning 
and training, exercises and drills; volunteer and surge capacity management; internal and 
external collaboration; and medical materiel and equipment management.  
The body of literature highlighted in chapter two of this paper, identifies the 
function, roles and responsibilities of emergency and disaster coordinators, and showed 
that there is a statistical correlation between these individuals and preparedness in other 
fields, which might have overlap in the context of hospitals. This chapter also identified 
and strengthened the rationale for the selection of Complexity theory as the theoretical 
framework for this study. It also provides context for identifying testable variables, which 
are those points of intersection between hospital preparedness for CBRN and mass 
casualty incident, pandemics and diseases outbreaks, and infrastructure failure and loss of 
function. These variables and testable measures were identified through identifying 






Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology leveraged in this study to 
determine the relationship between hospitals with DPDC and disaster preparedness as 
well as to identify the overall correlates to preparedness for the population. The research 
design section describes the research questions, corresponding hypotheses, and the 
dependent and independent variables associated with those research questions. The 
setting and sample section outlines the target populations. The section on instrumentation 
and materials discusses the survey instrument and implementation protocols. The data 
collection and analysis section describes the research hypotheses, level of measurement, 
statistical correlation methods, and considerations of validity and reliability. The final 
section in this chapter details ethical considerations and strategies for dissemination of 
the research findings.  
Research Design and Rationale 
Based on the research questions presented in Chapter 1, this study was designed 
to compare the preparedness of two groups: 1. NCR hospitals with DPDC; and 2. NCR 
hospitals without DPDC. Additionally, based on the overarching hypothesis, the study is 
designed to test the within group relationship between dependent variables and the 
independent variables of overall preparedness score, hospital profile and preparedness 
structure, preparedness spending and resource base, inter-agency and intra-facility 





theoretical framework for the study.  Complexity theory and the adaptability of complex 
systems refers to complex macroscopic collection of relatively similar and partially 
connected micro-structures – formed in order to adapt to the changing environment, and 
increase its survivability as a macro-structure. Complexity Theory provides a method in 
which a Hospital Emergency Preparedness Coordinator by which to manage these 
systems and subsystems, as well as provides a roadmap to navigate the internal and 
external factors associated with the systems approach (Spieler, Singer, & Cummings, 
2007b). 
In developing the construct for this study, and in order to develop a construct built 
on sound foundations, extensive research of the National Healthcare Preparedness 
Program, administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), was conducted to 
provide a basic foundation for required hospital preparedness capabilities. The National 
Healthcare Preparedness program defines eight key capabilities needed for hospitals and 
health care systems to effectively and efficiently prepare, respond, and recover from 
disasters with health implications or public health and medical emergencies. These 
capabilities include: (a) health care system preparedness; (b) health care system recovery; 
(c) emergency operations coordination; (d) fatality management; (e) information sharing; 
(f) medical surge; (g) responder health and safety; and (h) Volunteer management 
(ASPR, 2012). These eight capabilities served as the model for developing the dependent 





At its essence, complexity theory is concerned with stability and change in 
complex systems that consist of a great many independent agents that interact with each 
other in many ways (Waldrop, 1993, p. 11). The primary dependent variables in this 
study are the overall Preparedness Score, Training and Exercise Index, Preparedness 
Program Structure, Inter-agency and Intra-facility planning and coordination, and funding 
and resource base. Complexity theory was instrumental in scoping the key capabilities as 
well as in forming the overarch hypothesis that DPDC are correlated with higher 
reporting in these areas of hospital preparedness.  
From a practical perspective, testing each of the Hospital Preparedness Program 
(HPP) core capabilities and associated functions is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, a review of the literature did identify key capabilities and functions considered 
to be of increased importance as it relates to overall hospital preparedness, these include: 
1. Plans and the degree to which these plans account for an all hazards approach 
and response to disasters.  
2. Coordination of training and exercises among hospital staff and with support 
organizations. 
3. Staff and facility surge capacity. 
4. Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), 
and planning partnerships with other hospitals, health care facilities, state 





5. Overall hospital or system funding and access to funding and preparedness 
level resources.  
Each the six above elements are Systems-based functionalities and require considerable 
leadership and coordination to efficiently and effectively ensure that hospitals and health 
care systems are adequately prepared to respond to and recover from disasters.  
The research questions posed in Chapter 1 led to the identification of independent 
variables to be used in the study. The overarching research question was: What is the 
effect of DPDC on the overall preparedness reporting of hospitals? In addition, I 
examined the following sub questions and hypotheses:  
RQ1: Is there correlation between overall hospital preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC? 
RQ2: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
CBRN event and the employment of a DPDC? 
RQ3: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC? 
RQ4: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
mass casualty event and the employment of a DPDC? 
RQ5: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
an infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC? 
Based on the five research questions above, the primary predictor or independent variable 





the dependent variables are the same; however, the predictor or independent variable is 
the resource base and access to resources.  
 
 Kana and Bourque (2007), the study that serves as the model for the current study, 
the researched assessed the relationship between school preparedness and access to 
related resources, which in their model included a disaster preparedness coordinator.  As 
part of the current study, a similar research question was considered and served as the 
basis for an alternative hypothesis and line of analysis.  
AltR1: Is there a correlation between access to resources and overall resource 
base positively correlated with overall, CBRN, pandemic, mass casualty, and 
infrastructure failure/outage preparedness. 
I used data collected via a web-based survey, –the internet based tool Survey 
Monkey, – from member-hospitals of both the Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance and 
District 5 of the Maryland Hospital Association. These two groups represent urban and 
suburban areas bordering Washington, D.C. Both organizations have agreed to be part of 
the study and have extreme interest in its findings as well as in publishing the results. 
This design method was selected because it allowed the most flexibility and 
presented the least resource intensive method. This method was also selected because it 
represented the best alternative to ascertain the answers to the research questions. Kano 
and Bourque (2008) used a similar quantitative method to identify key determinants of 





School District that had access to a DPDC, even if only part-time, were more prepared 
(Kano & Bourque, 2008). The present study draws on this work as a framework for 
applying a similar methodology to health care infrastructure and its ability to provide care 
during disasters and during specific hazardous events.  
Setting, Sample, and Sampling Procedures 
The intended population for this study is all hospitals in the United States. While 
it is the goal of most research endeavors to be able to universally generalize findings, it is 
often not possible to do so (Trochim, 2006). It is more advantageous to attempt to be able 
to apply findings to a specific section of a larger population. In the present study, it is not 
feasible to have this as a goal for a multitude for reasons. Chief among them is time and 
resource constraints as well as a lack of access to this population. The population in the 
present study was selected because of its accessibility and its members’ willingness to 
participate in the study. The sampling frame for present study, the list of hospitals in the 
accessible population, is all of the hospitals in the NCR. The actual sample consists of 
hospitals from two distinct hospital trade groups within the accessible population. 
For the present study, the researcher approached the three major hospital alliances 
in the area known as the NCR that consists of Northern Virginia, Southern Maryland, and 
the District of Columbia. These areas include urban, suburban, rural, academic, and 
military hospitals. After several conference calls and negotiations, the Northern Virginia 





included in the sample population, and District of Columbia hospitals were excluded due 
to a lack of interest in participating in the project.  
The population surveyed for this study consisted of hospitals and the person or 
persons responsible for their preparedness programs and activities within the 
Washington, D.C. metro area, approximately 36-hospitals and acute care medical 
facilities (n = 36; Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance = 22 and District 5/Capitol Region 
of Maryland = 14). The surveyed hospitals are members of hospital associations that act 
as consortiums for thought, policy, and standard operating procedures, which include 
preparedness. Those individuals or internal offices charged with the coordination of each 
hospital's preparedness programs are responsible for planning, resource management, 
training and exercises, internal and external coordination, and a myriad of other tasks. 
They are also the best qualified to discuss information and issues related to the 
preparedness of the hospital because of they are the keepers of the internal knowledge 
relating to these programs. Additionally, it is the overarching hypothesis of this study that 
the individuals who serve in this capacity full-time will report higher overall index scores 
for each of the dependent variables. 
Sample size was calculated using G*Power 3.1.7. For a two-tailed point biserial 
correlation, using a medium effect size, an alpha of .05, and a power of .80, the 
recommended sample size was calculated to be 84 participants. To achieve empirical 
validity, 84 participants should take part in the study. However, because of resource and 





Northern Virginia and Southern Maryland Hospitals (N=36). The Kano and Bourque 
(2008) study, the archetype for the present study, had a response rate of 33% from a total 
accessible population of 470. The sample size for the study was 157-schools (Kano & 
Bourque, 2008). In the present study we know that the total accessible population equals 
36 (N=36). Based on the expected response rate as noted in Kano & Bourque, we can 
expect a sample size of 12-hospitals (n=12; Creech, 2011).  
Based on α and the expected sample size, our statistical power is .311 or a 31% 
probability of observing an actual effect. However, it must be noted that the participation 
rate is expected to be higher. It cannot be assumed that it will be 100% of the N. 
However, because of the populations’ interest in, collaboration, and intended post study 
partnership, it is expected to have at least a 60% or greater participation rate, which 
increases our statistical power to .608. 
Instrumentation and Materials 
The survey instrument employed for data collection consisted of an amalgam of 
specific sections of already validated and peer-reviewed instruments. These include but 
are not limited to: (a) the 2008 National Hospital Preparedness Supplement from the 
2007-2008 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey; and (b) the Agency for 
Health Research and Quality’s Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, and Explosive Events questionnaire. The data found in Chapter 2 suggest the 
variables selected are key factors in assessing and determining the overall preparedness 





capabilities to help frame the development of the instrumentation. Each of the survey 
instruments and checklists used to develop the instrument for the present study were 
developed for and used within federal programs as methods to gather preparedness data 
from health care providers in an effort to develop and refine preparedness and response 
criteria and grant funding vehicles. Additionally, each is open source and requires no 
formal permission for use. Validation of these instruments was done through internal 
processes that have not been shared in conjunction with the open source publication of 
these tools. 
The primary dependent variable for this study is Overall Hospital Preparedness 
which can be derived from looking at the pieces of the program and the individual 
hospitals in more general terms. The primary independent variable being studied is the 
employment of a DPDC. The survey instrument has been designed in such a way that it 
extracts pertinent preparedness related data from each of the hospitals, which makes up 
the preparedness score. The survey questions are provided in Appendix A. They were 
designed to determine the respondents’ assessment of their hospital facility’s level of 
overall preparedness, training and staff preparedness, preparedness program structure, 
internal and external planning, and resource base as they relate to both the primary and 
secondary dependent variables. The survey questionnaire consists of approximately 60 
questions and 100-elements, divided into the following sections, which correspond to the 
independent variables that make up the scoring of the dependent variables (for 





1. Hospital Demographic and Preparedness Program Structure 
2. General Preparedness 
3. CBRN and Mass Casualty Preparedness 
4. Pandemic Preparedness 
5. Infrastructure Failure/Outage Preparedness 
Much of the data collected by the survey instrument will be either categorical or 
binary in nature. However, the data collected from these will serve as a mechanism by 
which preparedness can be scored numerically, both as a whole and individual as well as 
based in parts based on sections of the survey instrument. In the scoring methodology 
score each element as with a one or a zero, with a total of approximately 100-points 
divided over the 5-primary sections. In this methodology: yes, equals 1; no or do not 
know equals zero; and not applicable receive not points at all. 
The survey will be administered to those individuals within survey population 
most responsible for the preparedness program at that facility with a link to the survey, 
which employed the Web-based Survey Monkey protocol. If this person cannot complete 
survey, the Preparedness Directors for each of the hospital organizations have agreed to 
complete the survey for the facility. In this eventuality, the individual will specify that 
they are answering of the facility by proxy. According to Rea and Parker (2005), there 
are both advantages and disadvantages to the Web-based survey. The advantages include 
convenience, rapid collection of survey, cost effectiveness, no time pressures, ease of 





to implement visual images and more complex questions. However, the disadvantages of 
the Web-based survey are the limitation to populations having access to e-mail, self-
selection bias, and a lack of interviewer involvement. 
Rea and Parker (2005) outlined a standard protocol for on-line surveys. These will 
be used for the present study and are as follows: 1) the survey description and invitation, 
including informed consent, and the survey questionnaire will be submitted to both 
hospital associations for approval. In preparation for this, meetings with the preparedness 
coordinators for each association were held at the outset of the prospectus process to 
propose the survey and garner support and buy-in for the project. Moreover, planning 
update meetings will be held at a regularly intervals to address concerns and to provide 
updates. After the final planning meeting, the description and invitation, including 
informed consent and the individuals within the member hospital were identified. These 
individuals will be provided a summary of the purposes, goals, and objectives of the 
survey via email. The survey questionnaire will contain a link to the Survey Monkey on-
line survey platform and detailed instructions will be provided describing the navigation 
of survey questionnaire. 
The researcher will be available by personal e-mail to address all potential 
questions related the survey questionnaire. The completed anonymous and confidential 
Survey Monkey survey data will be saved for data analysis on the researcher’s password-
protected computer and in the Survey Monkey cloud application. No one else will have 





interested respondents completing the survey within that period of time. The contingency 
plan for low response relies on the preparedness directors for the two organizations to 
assist the facility in completing the assessment.  
Data Collection 
This section provides an explanation of the analytical framework used in the 
study, which includes: statement of hypotheses as they relate to each research question; 
variable coding methodology; description of statistical analyses and analytical tools; and 
a description of the data collection methods.  
The research questions presented above may Preparedness for Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Events be framed or re-framed as 
testable hypotheses:  
RQ1: Is there correlation between overall hospital preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC? 
 
RQ2: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
CBRN events and the employment of a DPDC? 
RQ3: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC? 
RQ4: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 





RQ5: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
an infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC? 
The research questions (RQs) above can be reframed and translated into 
measurable and testable hypotheses in the following manner: 
H11 There is a correlation between overall preparedness and the employment of a 
DPDC. 
H01 There is no correlation between overall preparedness and employment of a 
DPDC.  
H1a There is a correlation between overall preparedness and access to resources 
and resources base.  
H12 There is a correlation between hospital CBRN preparedness and employment 
of a DPDC.  
H02 There is no correlation between CBRN preparedness and the employment of 
a DPDC.  
H2a There is a correlation between CBRN preparedness and access to resources 
and resources base.  
H13 There is a correlation between hospital preparedness for pandemic disease 
outbreaks and employment of a DPDC. 






H3a There is a correlation between pandemic preparedness and access to resources 
and resources base. 
H14 There is a correlation between hospital CBRN preparedness and employment 
of a DPDC.  
H04 There is no correlation between CBRN preparedness and the employment of 
a DPDC.  
H4a There is a correlation between CBRN preparedness and access to resources 
and resources base.  
H15 There is a correlation between hospital preparedness for infrastructure failure 
or outages and the employment of a DPDC. 
H05 There is no correlation between preparedness for infrastructure failure and 
employment of a DPDC.  
H5a There is a correlation between preparedness for infrastructure failure and 
access to resources and resources base.  
The study variables and structure of research hypotheses present in the study lend 
themselves to quantitative analysis. These variables can be express and coded in by in 
numerical values. As it relates to this study, the answers to these questions will coded as a 
one or zero which provides a numerical output score that provides a pathway for 
quantitative analysis.  
The Survey Monkey online survey tool provides data base structure that allows 





administration period, a weekly inspection of new survey submissions will be completed 
to ensure the accuracy of the data. Upon completion of the survey period, the data will be 
exported from the Survey Monkey platform into SPSS, already formatted. Once in SPSS, 
a final cleaning and accuracy check will be accomplished prior to any tabulation or 
statistical analysis is undertaken.  
Data Screening and Analysis 
Data will be entered into SPSS 22.0 for analysis. Data will be assessed for 
missing cases and univariate outliers. Data will be visually assessed for missing cases and 
participants who did not respond to large portions of the survey or skipped the survey 
item that asks, “Does your facility/system have a Designated Preparedness or Disaster 
Coordinator?” will be removed. Additionally, data will be assessed for univariate outliers 
by converting continuous variables to z scores. Converting data to z scores will 
standardize the data to a mean of zero and any cases with data more than 3.29 standard 
deviations from the mean will be removed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Final data 
analysis will be conducted on the remaining cases. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics will be conducted to describe the sample. Frequencies and 
percentages will be presented to report whether or not the participants’ facilities have a 
Designated Preparedness or Disaster Coordinator as well as other categorical variables of 





variables of interest, such as overall hospital preparedness, and level of preparedness for 
CBRN, mass casualty, pandemic disease outbreak, and infrastructure failure. 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach’s alpha values will be conducted to assess the internal consistency of 
overall hospital preparedness, as well as level of preparedness for CBRN, mass casualty, 
pandemic disease outbreak, and infrastructure failure. Values will be interpreted using the 
guidelines provided by George and Mallery (2010), where > .90 indicates excellent, > .80 
indicates good, > .70 indicates acceptable, and > .60 indicated acceptable.  
Research Questions 
Research Question One 
Is there a correlation between overall hospital preparedness and the employment 
of a DPDC? 
H10: There is not a correlation between overall hospital preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC. 
H1a: There is a correlation between overall hospital preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC. 
To assess research question one; a point biserial correlation will be conducted. 
The point biserial correlation is the appropriate analysis when the goal of research is to 
assess the relationship between a single continuous variable and a single dichotomous 
variable (Howell, 2010). In this analysis, the variables of interest will be overall hospital 





by the general hospital preparedness questions on the survey instrument. Responses will 
be averaged to create a hospital preparedness score. Scores will be treated as continuous 
data, and higher scores will indicate greater preparedness. Employment of a DPDC will 
be measured with the survey question that asks, “Does your facility/system have a 
Designated Preparedness or Disaster Coordinator?” Responses will be “yes” or “no” and 
will be treated as dichotomous data. The strength of the relationship will be assessed 
using Cohen’s standard (1988), where coefficients between .10 and .29 represent a small 
association; coefficients between .30 and .49 represent a medium association; and 
coefficients above .50 represent a large association. 
Prior to conducting the point biserial correlation, data will be assessed to be 
certain it meets the assumptions of normality and linearity. Normality assumes that the 
points are distributed in a bell shaped fashion and will be assessed with p-p plots. 
Linearity assumes a straight line relationship between both variables. Linearity will be 
assessed with the examination of scatter plots (Stevens, 2009). 
Research Question Two 
Is there a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
CBRN and mass casualty events and the employment of a DPDC? 
H20: There is not a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness 
for CBRN and mass casualty events and the employment of a DPDC. 
H2a: There is a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 





To assess research question two, two point biserial correlations will be conducted. 
One correlation will be conducted between hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
CBRN events and the employment of a DPDC. The other correlation will be conducted 
between hospital’s reported level of preparedness for mass casualty events and the 
employment of a DPDC. CBRN events will be measured by the CBRN preparedness 
questions on the survey instrument. Responses will be averaged to create a CBRN 
preparedness score. Scores will be treated as continuous data, and higher scores will 
indicate greater preparedness. Mass casualty events will be measured by the mass 
casualty preparedness questions on the survey instrument. Responses will be average to 
create a mass casualty preparedness score. Scores will be treated as continuous data, and 
higher scores will indicate greater preparedness. Employment of a DPDC will be 
measured with the survey question that asks, “Does your facility/system have a 
Designated Preparedness or Disaster Coordinator?” Responses will be “yes” or “no” and 
will be treated as dichotomous data. Correlation coefficients will be evaluated using 
Cohen’s (1988) standard. The same assumptions will be addressed prior to analysis. 
Research Question Three 
Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC? 
H30: There is not a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness 





H3a: There is correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC. 
To assess research question three, a point biserial correlation will be conducted. In 
this analysis, the variables of interest will be hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
a pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC. Hospital’s reported level 
of preparedness for a pandemic disease outbreak will be measured by the pandemic 
disease outbreak questions on the survey instrument. Responses will be averaged to 
create a level of preparedness for a pandemic disease outbreak score. Scores will be 
treated as continuous data, and higher scores will indicate greater preparedness. 
Employment of a DPDC will be measured with the survey question that asks, “Does your 
facility/system have a Designated Preparedness or Disaster Coordinator?” Responses will 
be “yes” or “no” and will be treated as dichotomous data. Correlation coefficients will be 
evaluated using Cohen’s (1988) standard. The same assumptions will be addressed prior 
to analysis. 
Research Question Four 
Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for an 
infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC? 
H40: There is not a correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness 
for an infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC. 
H4a: There is correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 





To assess research question four, a point biserial correlation will be conducted. In 
this analysis, the variables of interest will be hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
an infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC. Hospital’s reported level of 
preparedness for an infrastructure failure will be measured by the infrastructure questions 
on the survey instrument. Responses will be averaged to create a level of preparedness 
for an infrastructure failure score. Scores will be treated as continuous data, and higher 
scores will indicate greater preparedness. Employment of a DPDC will be measured with 
the survey question that asks, “Does your facility/system have a Designated Preparedness 
or Disaster Coordinator?” Responses will be “yes” or “no and will be treated as 
dichotomous data. Correlation coefficients will be evaluated using Cohen’s (1988) 
standard. The same assumptions will be addressed prior to analysis. 
Validity 
Face validity refers to whether an indicator; or in this case a question in the 
research survey, and appears is a substantively accurate measure of a variable (Babbie, 
2010). The questions presented in this survey for the dependent variable (level of hospital 
preparedness and designated DPDC) and the independent variables were separated 
categorically, and the questions were designed specifically by the researcher to provide a 
reasonable measure for the variables. 
External validity is defined as the degree to which a study’s conclusions would 
hold outside of a study's target population, in different setting, and at different places in 





designing and executing a research study. Based on the universal measures used to assess 
the dependent variable and the independent measures used to access the correlational 
relationship between these measures and DPDC, this study has external validity. 
However, the sample population of hospitals may present some challenges. For example, 
these sample population hospitals are only those which border the Washington, D.C. area, 
thus they are not fully representative of every hospital within United States. Additionally, 
within the population, there may not be homogeneity among the hospitals – meaning the 
comparison may be difficult because of the differences between the hospitals and the way 
they operate their preparedness programs or the hospital make-up. 
Construct validity is achieved by ensuring that the program is properly reflected 
in its construct and the measures are properly reflected in their construct (Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007). In this research, the cause constructs are the independent variables of 
employment of a DPDC, accreditation, funding and resource base, training and exercises, 
inter-agency and intra-facility planning, training and exercises, and status and level of 
responsibility of the DPDC. The effect construct is the dependent variable level of 
reported hospital preparedness. These constructs were selected based on the review and 
research hypotheses and questions derived from the same. Except for the survey 
questions pertaining to hospital and preparedness program profile, the remaining 
questions operationalized these cause and effect constructs and asked the respondents, 
individuals who are responsible, at least in-part, for preparedness to provide specific data 





Threats to internal validity can be reasons, conclusions, or inferences of a study 
that may be incorrect (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). They may occur in this study in the 
form of social interaction threats, where the survey respondents may not be completely 
objective due to fears of retribution from supervisors, managers, and administrators 
whom the respondents feel may have access to their survey responses (Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007). Because of the nature of the study, it will be difficult to avoid this. The 
individuals in the study are ultimately accountable to the leadership of the hospital, and 
thus may feel pressured to embellish survey responses. As the mechanism to counter this, 
respondents will be made aware the date will be aggregated and no single hospital will be 
called out specifically. An additional measure employed to counter this particular threat 
was to garner the support and buy-in of the overarching hospital associations and enlist 
them as partners to the study.  
Reliability  
Reliability is an indicator of the quality of a measurement, and may be defined as 
the degree to which a measurement is consistent, dependable, or repeatable (Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007). The primary types of reliability include: test-retest, internal-consistency 
reliability, and parallel-forms reliability. 
Test-retest reliability refers to the consistency of a measure from one time to 
another, i.e. administering the same instrument to the same subject multiple times and 
getting the same answers (Troochim, 2006). Due to the nature of the study, it was not 





availability of resources.  However, it is possible to evaluate internal–consistency 
reliability due to the design of the survey; it employs multiple survey questions related to 
each of the independent variables and the dependent variable. Several distinct and 
interrelated questions address each of the independent variable subtypes, as well as 
questions related dependent variable as a research hypothesis. It is also important to note 
that this study presents all survey respondents with standardized questions. It is for this 
reason, the chances of unreliability of the measurements have been significantly reduced 
and inter-rater or inter-observer reliability is high. Additionally, questions selected from 
the master instruments been carefully crafted and previously evaluated, reviewed, and 
validated which greatly to reduce respondent unreliability significantly and eliminate the 
need to conduct a time-consuming parallel-forms reliability assessment. 
Protection of Human Participants 
Informed consent will be maintained in this study by providing a formal invitation 
to participate to all potential respondents prior to providing the survey, which will be 
linked to the invitation. The procedure for providing these documents to potential 
participants by e-mail was discussed in the preceding section. The invitation to 
participate included a detailed discussion of the purpose of the study and the research 
questions to be addressed. The voluntary nature of participation in the survey was 
emphasized, as well as the anonymity of the survey responses. A brief discussion of 
potential social threats was given, as well as the reasons these threats are minimal given 





The participants in this survey will be protected by being afforded complete 
anonymity and confidentiality in the survey responses that they provided to the researcher 
through the survey administration via Survey Monkey. According to Babbie (2010), 
anonymity requires that the researcher and anyone reading the research findings would 
have no way of identifying a given response with a given respondent. Babbie further 
defined confidentiality in a research project as a guarantee by the researcher to the 
participants that even though the researcher may be able to identify a given subject’s 
responses, the researcher promises not to do so publicly. The survey data obtained from 
the local emergency coordinators will be maintained in a secure manner by the 
researcher, on the researcher’s password protected personal computer, and the response 
data was not and will not be released to any other individual without the express written 
consent of individual emergency management coordinators and their respective counties. 
No deception – methods use to mislead study participants – of the participants in 
this survey was planned or deemed necessary. The participants were provided contact 
information for the researcher if any questions were raised by the participants. Although a 
formal debriefing of individual participants is not planned, presentation of the findings to 
the participating hospitals and Hospital Associations will be provided, where all survey 
respondents and other relevant individuals may read and review them, post study. 
Dissemination of Findings 
This researcher anticipates publication of the study findings in a scholarly journal. 





publication of the finding of this research project, thus may be a potential publication 
partner. The primary journals under consideration are the American Medical Association 
Journal of Emergency and Disaster Medicine. However, because of its potential 
application outside of public health and medical preparedness, including those dealing 
with emergency management, political science, public policy, decision science, 
engineering, this researcher has also considered publication in the Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management and potential other similar journals. 
While every effort will be made to avoid or mitigate ethical issues, there are some 
potential ethical concerns. The main ethical concern in the present study is working so 
closely with trade/lobbying organizations. Both the NVHA and the Maryland hospital 
association are interested in using dissemination of the finding because they anticipated 
that they anticipate the outcome of the study will show a relationship between DPDCs 
and a specific facilities overall preparedness. However, if the null hypotheses prove to be 
true, both may seek to halt the dissemination or withdraw support for the study and its 
finding. While this would be a setback, it however, is not unexpected and therefore in not 
beyond some measure of control. The population and the sponsoring organizations have 
been appraised that the sample population is relatively small, therefore diluting the actual 
effect. Additionally, in the conversations leading up to their agreement to participate, 
both NVHA and the Maryland Hospital Association were in agreement that the results of 
the present study would only serve as an internal tool for refining their processes and 






This chapter presented the research methodology leveraged in this study to 
determine the relationship between hospital preparedness and the employment DPDC and 
access to resources and resource base. The research design and approach section 
described the research questions, corresponding hypotheses, and the dependent and 
independent variables associated with those research questions. The present study is a 
survey-based quantitative assessment of the relationship between overall and specific 
hazardous event preparedness and the position of a DPDC. It will use a survey instrument 
adapted from survey instruments designed and employed by HHS to help inform policy 
decisions. The setting and sample section outlined the target populations and provided 
calculations for the sample population (n=12). The section on instrumentation and 
materials discussed the survey instrument and implementation protocols. The data 
collection and analysis section described the research hypotheses, level of measurement, 
statistical correlation methods, and considerations of validity and reliability. The final 
section in this chapter detailed ethical considerations and strategies for dissemination of 
the research findings.  
The next chapter, Chapter 4, Results, presents the detailed results of the survey 
administered to the target population and the statistical analytical tests which determined 





Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
As stated previously, the purpose of this study was to ascertain if a correlation 
existed between the DPDC position and a hospital’s reported level of overall 
preparedness as well as for CBRN and mass casualty events, pandemics and disease 
outbreaks, and infrastructure failure. To that end, the following research questions and 
hypotheses were proposed, with an alternative research question added: 
RQ1: Is there correlation between overall hospital preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC? 
H01: There is no statistically significant correlation between overall 
preparedness and employment of a DPDC.  
H11: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between overall 
preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
RQ2: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
CBRN and mass casualty events and the employment of a DPDC? 
H02: There is no statistically significant correlation between CBRN 
preparedness and mass casualty event preparedness and the employment 
of a DPDC. 
H12: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between CBRN 
preparedness and mass casualty event preparedness and the employment 





RQ3: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC? 
H03: There is no statistically significant correlation between pandemic 
preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
H13: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between 
pandemic preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
RQ4: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
mass casualty event and the employment of a DPDC? 
H04: There is no statistically significant correlation between mass casualty 
event preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
H14: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between mass 
casualty event preparedness and employment of a DPDC.  
RQ5:  Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
an infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC? 
H05: There is no statistically significant correlation between preparedness 
for infrastructure failure and employment of a DPDC. 
H15: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between 
preparedness for infrastructure failure and employment of a DPDC. 
The data collection portion of this chapter describes the results of the data 
collection, provides descriptive and demographic properties of the sample, and describes 





section presents the descriptive statistics of the sample, the assumptions that were needed 
for statistical analyses, and in-depth reports of the research questions and outcomes. 
Tables of the descriptive and statistical analyses are included in the chapter. The final 
section includes an alternative hypothesis and a summary of the chapter. 
Data Collection 
Data collection took place over a 90-day period –January 1,-2015 and 1-April-
2015. At the collection period end date, a total of 71 hospitals had responded to the 
survey. Data was visually assessed for missing cases and participants who did not 
respond to large portions of the survey or skipped the survey item that asked, “Does your 
facility/system have a Designated Preparedness or Disaster Coordinator?” were removed. 
After the exclusion criteria, there remained 48 completed surveys to analyze.  
Participants were recruited from the pool of hospital administration and 
preparedness professionals in one of six groups on the professional networking website 
Linkedin.com. Of the approximately 1,100-combined members of the group, only 
roughly 400 were fully active within the groups during the collection period. An open 
invitation was placed on the list-serve of each group with the key stipulations related to 
being actively employed by a hospital or health care system and having oversight or 
direct responsibility for preparedness activities of the institution. Of the 400 active 
members during data collection, 71 responded, which is a response rate of 17.7%. Niska 
and Shimzu (2011) surveyed the universe of 5,212 hospitals with a response rate of 





hospitals does not seem to be representative of all hospitals, the sampling in this study did 
take into consideration differences in rural, urban, and suburban, and teaching, private, 
and public (Niska & Shimzu, 2011) In the current study, the make-up of the group 
membership was not determined at the time of recruitment. However, descriptive data 
suggest that the participants represented a diverse cross-section of hospital facility 
diversity.  
Reliability 
A Cronbach’s alpha test of reliability and internal consistency was conducted on 
the overall survey and each of the subscales. From the overall survey, questions 51, 77, 
83, 143, 147 were removed due to zero variance. The modified survey received a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .828. For the overall preparedness items, a Cronbach’s alpha of .621 
was achieved after questions 51, 55, 77, and 83 were removed. For level of preparedness 
for a CBRN, a Cronbach’s alpha of .636 was computed. Pandemic disease items had an 
alpha of .401. Items for the mass casualty preparedness had an alpha of .544 after the 
removal of question 95. Infrastructure failure items had an alpha of .507 after the removal 
of questions 141, 143, and 147. Access to resources received an alpha of .296 after the 
removal of question 30. Overall hospital preparedness and preparedness for a CBRN had 
questionable coefficients as suggested by George and Mallory (2010). Mass casualty 
preparedness and infrastructure failure preparedness had poor reliability. Pandemic 
outbreak preparedness and access to resources had unacceptable coefficients based upon 





There are a few reasons for the low internal consistencies between the subscales. 
Underlying factors such as fatigue and level of seriousness while taking the survey may 
have biased the responses. Other limitations as discussed in the methodology could be 
causative factors of the low internal consistency. As such, caution should be taken in 
interpreting the results of the analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The majority of participants fell into the category of one facility for number of 
facilities (36, 75%). Frequencies and percentages for nominal variables are presented in 
Table 1.  
Table 1. 
Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables 
Variables N % 
   
Number of facilities   
More than one 12 25 
One 36 75 
Employment of DPDC   
No DPDC 2 4 
DPDC employed 46 96 
DPDC employment status   
Part-time 8 17 
Full-time 38 79 
None 2 4 
Note.  Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100. 
Means and Standard Deviations 
For a hospital’s overall reported level of preparedness (GEN), scores ranged from 





of preparedness for a mass casualty event (MASS), scores ranged from 2.00 to 7.00, with 
an average score of 6.15 (SD = 1.11). For a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
CBRN event (CBRN), scores ranged from 5.00 to 12.00, with an average score of 10.15 
(SD = 1.87). For a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a pandemic disease 
outbreak (PAN), scores ranged from 2.00 to 6.00, with an average score of 4.71 (SD = 
1.13). For a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for infrastructure (INFR), scores 
ranged from 4.00 to 7.00, with an average score of 6.73 (SD = 0.61). For a hospital’s 
reported access to resources (ResAcc), scores ranged from 1.00 to 3.00, with an average 
score of 2.21 (SD = 0.71). Means and standard deviations for continuous variables are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Independent Variables 
Variable M SD 
   
GEN 23.50 2.48 
MASS 6.15 1.11 
CBRN 10.15 1.87 
PAN 4.71 1.13 
INFR 6.73 0.61 
ResAcc 2.21 0.71 
 
Research Question 1 
To assess research question 1, a point biserial correlation was conducted. The 
point biserial correlation (rpb) is appropriate when the research purpose is to evaluate if a 
relationship exists between a continuous variable and a dichotomous variable, and to find 





to analysis, the assumptions of the point biserial correlation were assessed. Point biserial 
correlation assumptions include normality and homoscedasticity. Normality was assessed 
using a normal P-P plot, and the assumption was met. Homoscedasticity was assessed 
with a residuals scatterplot, and this assumption was also met. 
Results of the point biserial correlation were not significant, (r = -.04, p = .78). 
Because significance was not found, null hypothesis 1 could not be rejected. This finding 
suggested that no relationship exists between overall hospital preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC. Table 3 below shows the correlations between employment of 
DPDC and the different subscales. 
Research Question 2 
To assess research question 2, a point biserial correlation was conducted. Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the point biserial correlation were assessed and also met. 
Results of the point biserial correlation were not significant, (r = .02, p = .91). 
Because significance was not found, null hypothesis 2 could not be rejected. This finding 
suggested that no relationship exists between a hospital’s CBRN preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC. Table 3 below shows the correlations between employment of 
DPDC and the different subscales. 
Research Question 3 
To assess research question 3, a point biserial correlation was conducted. Prior to 





Results of the point biserial correlation were not significant, (r = .13, p = .37). Because 
significance was not found, null hypothesis 3 could not be rejected. This finding 
suggested that no relationship exists between a hospital’s preparedness for pandemic 
disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC. Table 3 below shows the correlations 
between employment of DPDC and the different subscales. 
Research Question 4 
To assess research question 4, a point biserial correlation was conducted. Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the point biserial correlation were assessed and also met.  
Results of the point biserial correlation were not significant, (r = -.07, p = .65). 
Because significance was not found, null hypothesis 4 could not be rejected. This finding 
suggested that no relationship exists between a hospital’s preparedness for a mass 
casualty event and the employment of a DPDC. Table 3 below shows the correlations 
between employment of DPDC and the different subscales. 
Research Question 5 
To assess research question 5, a point biserial correlation was conducted. Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the point biserial correlation were assessed and also met.  
Results of the point biserial correlation were not significant, (r = -.09, p = .53). Because 
significance was not found, null hypothesis 5 could not be rejected. This finding 
suggested that no relationship exists between a hospital’s preparedness for an 
infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC. Table 3 below shows the 






Correlations Between Employment of DPDC and Independent Variables 
 
 DPDC GEN CBRN PAN MASS INFR 
DPDC Pearson Correlation 1 -.038 .016 .132 -.060 -.088 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .797 .912 .370 .687 .554 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
GEN Pearson Correlation -.038 1 .621** .465** .586** .384** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .797  .000 .001 .000 .007 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
CBRN Pearson Correlation .016 .621** 1 .464** .595** .412** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .912 .000  .001 .000 .004 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
PAN Pearson Correlation .132 .465** .464** 1 .352* .298* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .370 .001 .001  .014 .040 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
MASS Pearson Correlation -.060 .586** .595** .352* 1 .424** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .687 .000 .000 .014  .003 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
INFR Pearson Correlation -.088 .384** .412** .298* .424** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .554 .007 .004 .040 .003  
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 
To assess the alternative hypotheses, Pearson correlations were conducted. Prior 
to the analyses, assumptions of the Pearson correlation were assessed, including linearity 
and homoscedasticity. Linearity assumes a straight line relationship between the 





normally distributed about the regression line. Linearity and homoscedasticity were 
assessed by examination of scatter plots and all assumptions were met. 
Results of the Pearson correlation were significant for CBRN (r = .36, p = .01), 
PAN (r = .31, p = .04) and INR (r = .34, p = .02). These finding suggested that a positive 
relationship exists between a hospital’s access to resources and CBRN, pandemic 
outbreak, and infrastructure failure preparedness. Table 4 below shows the correlations 






Correlations Between Access to Resources and the Independent Variables 
 
 ResAcc DPDC GEN CBRN PAN MASS INFR 
ResAcc Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .170 .203 .359* .305* .171 .343* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .247 .165 .012 .035 .245 .017 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
DPDC Pearson 
Correlation 
.170 1 -.038 .016 .132 -.060 -.088 
Sig. (2-tailed) .247  .797 .912 .370 .687 .554 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
GEN Pearson 
Correlation 
.203 -.038 1 .621** .465** .586** .384** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .165 .797  .000 .001 .000 .007 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
CBRN Pearson 
Correlation 
.359* .016 .621** 1 .464** .595** .412** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .912 .000  .001 .000 .004 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
PAN Pearson 
Correlation 
.305* .132 .465** .464** 1 .352* .298* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .370 .001 .001  .014 .040 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
MASS Pearson 
Correlation 
.171 -.060 .586** .595** .352* 1 .424** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .245 .687 .000 .000 .014  .003 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
INFR Pearson 
Correlation 
.343* -.088 .384** .412** .298* .424** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .554 .007 .004 .040 .003  
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 







Since significant correlations were not found in the different subscales by 
employment DPDC, two ancillary analyses were conducted. The first analysis sought to 
uncover any differences in scores by the number of facilities a hospital answered for, 
while the second look for any correlations in the subscales and whether a DPDC was 
employed as a full or part-time employee.  
Classifying responses by one facility (n = 36) and multiple facilities (n = 12), 
correlations were assessed for the subscales and employment of a DPDC. A point biserial 
correlation was conducted between the subscales and the amount of facilities answered 
for, and the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were met. 
The results of the correlations were only significant for pandemic outbreak 
preparedness for respondents that answered for only one facility (r = .42, p = .01). This 
finding suggested a positive relationship between employment of a DPDC and pandemic 
outbreak preparedness, for singular hospitals. The results of the correlations between 
employment of a DPDC and the different subscales by number of facilities answered for 






Correlation Between Employment of DPDC and Independent Variables by Number of 
Facilities 
 




DPDC Pearson Correlation 1 -.084 .047 .115 -.290 -.135 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.794 .884 .723 .361 .676 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
GEN Pearson Correlation -.084 1 .626* .645* .576* .792** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .794  .029 .023 .050 .002 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
MASS Pearson Correlation .047 .626* 1 .796** .665* .908** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .884 .029 
 
.002 .018 .000 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
CBRN Pearson Correlation .115 .645* .796** 1 .616* .884** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .723 .023 .002 
 
.033 .000 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
PAN Pearson Correlation -.290 .576* .665* .616* 1 .676* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .361 .050 .018 .033 
 
.016 





INFR Pearson Correlation -.135 .792** .908** .884** .676* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .676 .002 .000 .000 .016 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
One DPDC Pearson Correlation 1 -.030 -.131 -.074 .417* -.078 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .864 .446 .667 .011 .650 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
GEN Pearson Correlation -.030 1 .465** .582** .433** .309 
Sig. (2-tailed) .864  .004 .000 .008 .066 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
MASS Pearson Correlation -.131 .465** 1 .583** .317 .476** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .446 .004  .000 .060 .003 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
CBRN Pearson Correlation -.074 .582** .583** 1 .407* .389* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .667 .000 .000  .014 .019 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
PAN Pearson Correlation .417* .433** .317 .407* 1 .208 
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .008 .060 .014  .223 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
INFR Pearson Correlation -.078 .309 .476** .389* .208 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .650 .066 .003 .019 .223  
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 





After classifying responses by employment of a DPDC and then by whether the 
DPDC was a full (n=8) or part-time (n=38) employee, additional correlations were 
assessed for the subscales. A point biserial correlation was conducted between the 
subscales and the employment status of the DPDC, and the assumptions of linearity and 
homoscedasticity were met. 
The results of the correlation showed no significance in employment status of a 
DPDC and the different subscales. These findings suggest that no relationship exists 
between the employment status of a DPDC and the different subscales. Table 6 below 
















1 .004 .007 .213 -.238 -.103 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .979 .965 .154 .111 .496 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
GEN Pearson 
Correlation 
.004 1 .626** .511** .588** .382** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .979  .000 .000 .000 .009 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
CBRN Pearson 
Correlation 
.007 .626** 1 .549** .593** .418** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .965 .000  .000 .000 .004 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
PAN Pearson 
Correlation 
.213 .511** .549** 1 .430** .337* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .154 .000 .000  .003 .022 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
MASS Pearson 
Correlation 
-.238 .588** .593** .430** 1 .423** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .111 .000 .000 .003  .003 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
INFR Pearson 
Correlation 
-.103 .382** .418** .337* .423** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .496 .009 .004 .022 .003  
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 








The results of the research questions showed no significant relationships between 
employment of a DPDC and the different subscales of hospital preparedness. The 
alternative hypothesis showed positive relationships between a hospital’s access to 
resources and CBRN, pandemic outbreak, and infrastructure failure preparedness. An 
ancillary analysis was conducted and a significant positive relationship was found 
between employment of a DPDC and pandemic outbreak preparedness in respondents 
that answered for one facility. A second ancillary analysis was conducted and no 
significant relationships were found to exist between the employment status of a DPDC 
and the different subscales. As stated earlier, any findings of this study should be 
cautiously interpreted due to the low internal consistency of the different subscales of 
hospital preparedness. 
In Chapter 5, the Discussion, an in-depth interpretation of the findings will be 
presented and the limitations of this study will be examined. The chapter will describe the 
ways in which the findings can be used to extend the knowledge of this topic and will 





Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to assess the relationship between the 
hospital preparedness in general, hospital preparedness for CBRN events, hospital 
preparedness for mass casualty events, hospital preparedness for pandemic disease 
outbreaks, hospital preparedness for pandemic infrastructure failure, and the employment 
of a designated hospital preparedness coordinator, with the hypothesis that there was a 
correlation between the employment of these individuals and the reported level of 
preparedness for special hazard category. An additional hypothesis was put forward in 
the current study, as well, to assess the relationship between access to resources and the 
reported level of preparedness for the same hazard categories. This chapter provides 
analysis of the research finding and limitations, a discussion on the implications for social 
change, as well as recommendations for future research and action.  
Background and Study Summary  
The current study is modeled after a study conducted by Kano and Bourque 
(2008) that attempted to identify the correlates of school preparedness in Los Angeles 
Unified School District (Kano & Bourque, 2008). The current study used a similar 
research construct to attempt to identify a correlation between the employment of a 
DPDC, or alternatively, a hospital's access to resources. The study examined five key 
research questions and corresponding hypotheses, and five alternative research questions 





preparedness for CBRN incidents, mass casualty events, pandemic disease events, and 
infrastructure failure, as well as overall preparedness.  
Using Kano and Bourque (2008) as a model, the study identified two specific 
correlates of preparedness associated with school preparedness and applied them to 
hospital preparedness to identify a correlation between effects of the two independent 
variables on the five dependent variables. It is worth noting that while several studies 
including Higgins et al. (2004), Kaji et al. (2008), and Nelson, Lurie, Wasserman, & 
Zakowski (2007) have attempted to ascertain if hospitals have complied with new 
mandates and if federal grant dollars spent were used to bolster preparedness, no 
statistical rigor has, to this point, been applied to identifying such a relationship. This is 
especially true as it relates to spending on personnel and its influence on the way a 
hospital reported overall preparedness and preparedness for the special hazard categories.  
Analysis of Findings 
The current study used as a convenience sample of members of several 
Linkedin.com group members associated with hospital and health care preparedness. 
While the groups had a combined membership of roughly 1,100 members, only 400 were 
truly active. As a result, the global population was N=400. Seventy-one specific hospital 
facilities were represented by the respondents with a total number of 48 individuals 
responding (n=48). Twelve (25%) of the 48 total respondents responded for two or more 





38 (79%) reporting full-time employment. Only two facilities did not employ a disaster 
preparedness coordinator.  
Research Questions 
To assess research question one through five, point biserial correlations were 
conducted. The point biserial correlation (rpb) is appropriate when the research purpose 
is to evaluate if a relationship exists between a continuous variable and a dichotomous 
variable, and to find the magnitude of that correlation or the strength of that relationship 
(Howell, 2010). Correlation values close to +1 indicate a strong relation between the 
dependent and independent variables. The following research questions, null hypotheses 
and alternative hypotheses were tested:   
RQ1: Is there correlation between overall hospital preparedness and the 
employment of a DPDC? 
H01: There is no statistically significant correlation between overall 
preparedness and employment of a DPDC.  
H11: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between overall 
preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
RQ2: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
CBRN and mass casualty events and the employment of a DPDC? 
H02: There is no statistically significant correlation between CBRN 
preparedness and mass casualty event preparedness and the employment 





H12: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between CBRN 
preparedness and mass casualty event preparedness and the employment 
of a DPDC. 
RQ3: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
pandemic disease outbreak and the employment of a DPDC? 
H03: There is no statistically significant correlation between pandemic 
preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
H13: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between 
pandemic preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
RQ4: Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
mass casualty event and the employment of a DPDC? 
H04: There is no statistically significant correlation between mass casualty 
event preparedness and employment of a DPDC. 
H14: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between mass 
casualty event preparedness and employment of a DPDC.  
RQ5:  Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
an infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC? 
H05: There is no statistically significant correlation between preparedness 
for infrastructure failure and employment of a DPDC. 
H15: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between 





Results of the point biserial correlations were not significant for research 
questions one through five: RQ1 = (r = -.04, p = .78); RQ2 = (r = .02, p = .91); RQ3 = (r = 
.02, p = .91); RQ4 = (r = -.07, p = .65); RQ5 = (r = -.09, p = .53). Because significance 
was not reached, null hypotheses could not be rejected for RQ1-5. This finding suggested 
that no relationship exists between overall hospital preparedness, preparedness for CBRN 
events, mass casualty events, pandemic disease outbreaks, infrastructure failures, and the 
employment of a DPDC.  
Additional Analysis 
Since no significant correlation was found, an additional set of hypotheses and 
research questions were analyzed to identify if there was a correlation between each of 
the reported special hazard scores and the full-time (n = 36) or part-time (n = 8) 
employment status of the preparedness coordinator. Additionally, analysis was conducted 
to assess the correlation between the number of hospitals for which a respondent 
answered for more than one facility (n = 12) and the special hazard scores. When 
assessing by full- or part-time employment status, pandemic preparedness and full-time 
employment of a preparedness coordinator reached significance. When assessing by 
number of hospitals responded, there was no significant correlation between number of 






To assess the alternative hypothesis, access to preparedness related resources 
correlates to the level of reported preparedness, Pearson’s Correlation analysis was 
conducted to assess the following questions, null hypotheses, and hypotheses:  
1. Is there correlation between Overall Hospital Preparedness and access to 
preparedness related resources? 
AH1o: There is no statistically significant correlation between overall 
preparedness and access to preparedness related resources.  
AH1a: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between overall 
preparedness and access to preparedness related resources. 
2. Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for 
CBRN and mass casualty events and the employment of a DPDC? 
AH2o: There is no statistically significant correlation between CBRN 
preparedness and access to preparedness related resources. 
AH2a: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between CBRN 
preparedness and access to preparedness related resources. 
3. Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
pandemic disease outbreak and access to preparedness related resources? 
AH3o: There is no statistically significant correlation between pandemic 





AH3a: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between 
pandemic preparedness and access to preparedness related resources. 
4. Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for a 
mass casualty event and access to preparedness related resources? 
AH4o: There is no statistically significant correlation between mass casualty 
event preparedness and access to preparedness related resources. 
AH4a: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between mass 
casualty event preparedness and access to preparedness related resources.  
5. Is there correlation between a hospital’s reported level of preparedness for an 
infrastructure failure and the employment of a DPDC? 
AH5o: There is no statistically significant correlation between preparedness 
for infrastructure failure access to preparedness related resources. 
AH5a: There is a statistically significant positive correlation between 
preparedness for infrastructure failure and access to preparedness related 
resources. 
Pearson correlation were significant for CBRN (r = .36, p = .01), PAN (r = .31, p 
= .04) and INR (r = .34, p = .02), suggesting that a positive relationship exists between a 







As previously mentioned, the current study was modeled after Kano & Bourque 
(2008). In their study, Kano & Bourque found that school in the Los Angeles Unified 
School System reported higher levels of preparedness when they had access, which they 
defined as at least one source of funding (Kano & Bourque, 2008). They also found that 
hospitals with at least part-time access to a preparedness coordinator reported greater 
access to preparedness equipment and supplies. Kano & Bourque also found that schools 
were more likely to have implemented and met state and county preparedness 
requirements when access to a preparedness coordinator was available 
In this current study, all but one of the primary hypotheses was disproven. Only 
pandemic preparedness and the full-time employment of disaster preparedness 
coordinator showed a positive relationship. Conversely, results of the analysis of the 
alternative hypotheses show that there is a positive relationship between preparedness 
resources and preparedness for CBRN incidents, pandemic disease outbreaks, and 
infrastructure failure, but no relationship between availability of resources and overall 
preparedness or mass casualty events.  
Designated Preparedness Coordinator and Pandemic Preparedness  
In the current study, no correlation was found between the employment of a 
designated preparedness coordinator and the reported level of preparedness for general 
preparedness or any of the special hazards, which led to the rejection of all five of 





relationship between the preparedness coordinators, general preparedness, and special 
hazards, looking at full-time versus part-time coordinators, the results found a correlation 
between full-time preparedness coordinators and pandemic preparedness. This was the 
only special hazard that correlated with the employment of a designated hospital 
preparedness coordinator.  
These finding are fully in line with current national priorities and the concept of 
operations established by the U.S. CDC and adopted by states and local health 
authorities, and hospitals and health care providers. Even before the 2009 pandemic 
outbreak of H1N1 Influenza, U.S. DHHS had already established the recommendation, in 
its 2006 Medical Offices and Clinic Pandemic Influenza Checklist, to designate a person 
who is responsible for coordinating all activities related to pandemic preparedness and 
response (CDC, 2006). This is really the only place in the literature where a designated 
coordinator is recommended or mentioned for a specific hazard for health care providers. 
This provides a potential strong basis for the positive relationship between a full-time 
disaster preparedness coordinator and pandemic preparedness. This may also explain why 
in the analysis of the five original research questions, this relationship had the highest 
positive relationship even though significance was not reached.  
Access/Availability of Resources  
While it would seem to be common sense that resources and funding would 
correlate to greater reported preparedness, the current study only found positive 





mass casualty preparedness. Resource availability does provide greater opportunities to 
purchase training equipment and other resources. However, the relative amount of 
funding versus the simple indication of a source of funding resource maybe a better 
indicator of preparedness and explain the lack of a positive relationship between the other 
factors. It may also indicate that resources alone do not equal an increase level of hospital 
preparedness.  
As Kano & Bourque (2008), pointed out, schools in L.A. Unified were more 
likely to spend funds on targeted preparedness initiatives, which may have been peculiar 
to that school. This is almost certainly true for hospitals as well. Hospitals, as part of 
accreditation requirements and HHS grant funding process are required to conduct hazard 
and risk assessments. Since September 11, 2001, several events have placed sharp focus 
on special hazards, specifically, those focused on in the current study, including: 1) the 
anthrax attacks in 2002; 2) Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy; and 3) H1N1 Pandemic 
Influenza – 2009 (CDC, 2013, Khan & Ashford, 2001; 2000; and Ziskin & Harris, 2007). 
This may provide an explanation as to why this study found a positive relationship 
between hazards most closely related with these events and access to resources. Recent 
history and national priorities may have and continue to potentially bias the perception of 
individuals conducting these assessments at the hospital’s operational level.  
Hartwell (2013) highlights another potential explanation for the positive 
correlative relationship between reported CBRN preparedness, pandemic preparedness, 





in the post 9/11-post-Katrina era have been focused on specific hazards (Hartwell, 2012). 
In her study of hospital preparedness policy, she found that state and local hospital 
preparedness initiatives and policy have tended to mirror national policy and priorities as 
opposed to local priorities (Hartwell, 2013).  September 11th, Amerithrax, Hurricane 
Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, Pandemic H1N, and imported Ebola cases have shaped U.S. 
preparedness and response policy and priorities, including those related to hospital 
preparedness. These ever-evolving and mounting focuses have prompted state and local 
governments to shift policy initiatives and mandates for hospitals to prepare for these 
events.    
Context of the Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework for this study was complexity theory. In this study, we 
viewed hospitals as complex adaptive systems, which are a macroscopic collection of 
micro-level and semi-related components. Preparedness within these multi-level, 
connected and interrelated systems become increasing more and more complex as each 
new layer of regulation, hazard, risk, and operational tempo increase. The primary 
hypotheses for this study assumed these ever-increasing complex networks required the 
management, oversight, expertise, and coordination of an individual or staff that could 
navigate the preparedness landscape and response for the special hazards discussed in this 
paper. However, what the current study highlights is that access to resources is a better 





preparedness coordinator a resource may also better explain the finding in the current 
study, which were demonstrated by Kano & Bourque (2008).  
Limitations 
No study is without limitations or things that would potentially call into question 
its validity or ability to be generalized to a global population. This study is not without its 
own limitations. The current study’s two main potential limitations are its sample size 
and sampling methodology and low internal consistency of two of the subscales – mass 
casualty events and infrastructure failure. This section will discuss the potential 
limitations of this study, explanation, and mitigation measures.  
Sample and Sampling Methodology 
The sample was a convenience sample. The population was a captive audience 
that was all too willing to assist in the research. However, this may have led to a very 
heterogeneous sample of hospitals that employed preparedness coordinators – highlighted 
by the only two hospitals reporting not employing coordinators. An additional limitation 
related to sampling is sample size. Seventy-one hospitals were represented in the study. 
However, there are more than 5,000 studies in the United States (Niska & Shimzu, 2011). 
This small sample size does present a challenge to generalizing the results. However, 
they do provide at least some baseline and a potential road map for future research. 
Internal Consistency  
Internal consistency describes how closely related individual items on an 





Cronbach’s Alpha to measure internal consistency of the overall instrument and its 
subscales. However, mass casualty preparedness and infrastructure failure preparedness 
had poor reliability. Pandemic outbreak preparedness and access to resources had an 
unacceptable coefficient. However, Cronbach’s Alpha and other measures of internal 
consistency are very good at measuring very narrow constructs (Sijtsma, 2009). The 
current study used very broad constructs across each of the sub-scales due the very broad 
nature of each of the special hazards. An additional factor, the lends weight to the 
effectiveness of the measures is the fact that the current study used combined assessments 
used by Niska & Shimzu (2008) to assess overall hospital preparedness, and by HRSA in 
2007 to assess CBRNE preparedness of U.S. hospitals.  
Implications for Social Change 
This current study is almost certainly the first of its kind to apply statistical rigor 
to identifying correlates to hospital preparedness, or at least hospital preparedness for 
special hazards including CBRN events, pandemic disease outbreaks, and infrastructure 
failures. While collected from a limited sample population, the data illustrates a positive 
relationship between the employment of a full time hospital preparedness coordination 
and pandemic preparedness; as well as a positive correlation between access to resources 
and reported levels of CBRN preparedness, pandemic preparedness, and infrastructure 
failure. The study is consistent with finding of previous studies of school preparedness, 





The current study highlights how complex the construct of hospital and health 
care preparedness are. It also highlights the importance of continued investment and 
access to resources with regards to hospital the preparedness, especially for those special 
hazards highlighted in this study. While not borne out by the data collected and analyzed 
in this study, there is most likely some intangible, and maybe unmeasurable effect of a 
hospital preparedness coordinator on a hospitals overall preparedness and for the special 
hazard outlined in this paper, pandemic preparedness notwithstanding. This study shows 
that manipulation of these factors can positively or negatively impact the reported level 
of preparedness of a hospital and the real operational preparedness of a hospital to 
respond to catastrophic events.  
In context of this research, the achievement of positive social change may be 
considered to be development and implementation of policies that incentivize hospitals as 
private entities to bear most of the cost burden for being part of a whole community 
approach to preparedness.  This potentially would facilitate a sustainable model of 
hospital preparedness resourcing and program management for the full-spectrum of 
hazard response, which would almost certainly increase both the security in and 
resilience of U.S. communities.  
In the context of positive social change, this study highlights that the current 
system of grant funding hospital preparedness may not be sustainable over time. As 
national-level priorities change or the perception of risk changes for any given hazard, so 





The challenge lies at the owner-operator and strategic government level. The key to 
positive social change will be the innovative methods, initiative, and policy prescriptions 
that provide communities with a resilient health care delivery system that is able to 
withstand, adapt, overcome, and continue to serve the community before, during, and 
after catastrophic event.  
Recommendations for Action 
Research conducted at the cross roads between health security and public policy 
should never be just an academic exercise, which lends only abstract concepts and ideas. 
Such research should be used to inform sound policy in those areas under study. With this 
as a salient fact, the following recommendations for action are provided.  
The preliminary results and findings of the current study will be shared with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Assistant Secretary of Health Affairs and Chief 
Medical Officer and the Senior Advisor for Community Health Resilience. They will also 
be shared with the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy with the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response within DHHS, as well as the primary 
Senior Executives for the Hospital Preparedness Program. Additionally, the current study 
will be shared with the current Dean of the Saint Louis University School of Public 
Health and the Director of the Institute for Biosecurity. As an additional recommended 
action, an offer has been made to brief these findings to the DHHS Sector Specific Lead 





Public Hospitals and Health Systems, and state and local hospital coalitions and 
associations.  
While the focus of the current study is limited to hospital preparedness, it has 
potential applicability to other emergency management and preparedness functions, and 
therefore should be disseminated to the widest audience possible. The recommended 
action is to publish the results and conclusions of the research in one or more professional 
and/or academic journals. The Journal of the American Medical Association and the 
Journal of Homeland Security of Emergency Management which are both primary 
journals for peer-reviewed research in health security and emergency management.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
While the current study had participants from across the spectrum of hospitals and 
regions of the country, the sample size in comparison to the total global population was 
extremely small. Seventy-one hospitals were represented in the current study, which is 
roughly 1.4% of the over 5000 hospitals in the United States. As a result, the study may 
have an under representation of hospitals without designated disaster preparedness 
coordinators, which would potentially change the finding. A future iteration of this study 
would release it to a larger more formal sample population. 
As previously mentioned, this study was modeled after a study conducted by 
Bourque and Kano (2008) that looked at the correlates of preparedness in schools. In 
their study, the preparedness coordinator was considered a resources and not a standalone 





unto itself. Based on our theoretical framework for this study, complexity theory, 
including the hospital preparedness coordinator as part a package or pool of resources 
may provide a better picture of what specific resources correspond to which aspects of 
preparedness. For instance, in the model study Kano & Bourque found that access to a 
coordinator correlated with greater access to preparedness related equipment and supplies 
(Kano & Bourque, 2008). They also found, as did a previous study, that schools with 
access to programs coordinators were more likely to comply with state and federal 
guidelines for the respective programs. A future iteration of this study would look at what 
specific individual attributes and resources correlate to preparedness across the five 
subscales in the current study. Essentially, the future study would analyze the relationship 
between resources and the preparedness coordinator, and individual aspects of resource 
availability and analyze the relationship to each of the special hazards and overall 
preparedness.  
Conclusion 
The current study identified at least two correlates of specific aspects of hospital 
preparedness, illustrating that preparedness program management and resourcing are 
important to at least some aspects of preparedness. Based on an analysis on a body of 
literature on hospital preparedness, this is probably the first study to apply statistical rigor 
to examining this relationship. While the population of the study was only a small 
representation the total number of hospital in the U.S., the study provides some baseline 





correlation between resources, coordinators, and some aspects of hospital preparedness, 
illustrates a continued need for investment, especially if we place a high priority on these 
hazards and a hospital’s role in a community’s ability to respond to and recover from 
these types of disasters. The Federal government is the largest investor in hospital 
preparedness. However, the level of investment continues to decline as we get farther and 
farther removed from the seminal event that led to increased government spending on 
preparedness (Pine, Pilkington, & Seabury, 2014; Fisher & Duffman, 2014). Based on the 
current finding reductions in funding will almost certainly affect the ability of hospitals to 
prepare and respond to the needs of a community in disaster. The relationship between 
resources and preparedness highlights the some of the inherent challenges associated with 
the current model and calls into question the long-term sustainability of the current model 
where the Federal government is in the main source of preparedness funding for many 
hospitals. Change and more specifically social change can only be achieved and sustained 
to when state, local, and federal policy and hospital owner operators develop a 
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